We model strategic trading by a rent-seeking insider, who exchanges without being spotted, and propose a comprehensive theory of market non-anonymity. Several novel results are established. They depend on asset value proprieties, beliefs, inter-temporal choices, and investors' characteristics. In equilibrium, under a regulation mandating public trade revelation, disclosures may shift prices. If they do, uninformed manipulations arise only in some instances. Speci…cally, insiders constrained on asset holdings earn more than they would without such a disclosure rule. Consequently, mandating disclosures is unnecessary, as informative trades will be revealed voluntarily. This result reveals a previously unexplored link to the literature on (uncerti…ed/non-factual) announcements.
1
This paper considers small traders-i.e., traders whose transactions cannot be spottedwho are subject to a so called capital constraint or risk limit, 2 and proposes a comprehensive theory of market non-anonymity. We examine public disclosure to interpret the e¤ects of mandatory and voluntary reports about undertaken trades, and establish several novel results, including: (1) Disclosures do not always a¤ect prices; (2) when they do, only in speci…c instances the investor, when uninformed, manipulates the market; and (3) for disclosure to be forthcoming, it does not have to be mandatory, as the investor will disclose informative trades voluntarily. The …rst two results depend on the asset value properties; on alternative (but correct) market beliefs associated with disclosure; on the weight assigned to present and future pro…ts (that is, on the inter-temporal discount factor); and on the trader's characteristics, which translate into how likely he is to know about the real asset value today and to have inside information in the future. The third result not only tells us that regulators do not need to make laws against missed trade reporting and invigilate for it-rather, they need to identify who best should be allowed to report trades of a speci…c stock-it also represents the intermediate step to extend our study to the voluntary disclosure of (uncerti…ed/non-factual) announcements, which can be spread, for example, through the media in concert with journalists (e.g., see Sobel (2000) , p. 248) or by starting rumors, with predictions in line with the …rst two points above. These predictions do not rely on the assumption of a trader that (with positive probability) reports information 'honestly,'conversely imposed in previous models of inside announcements.
In order, let's …rst consider mandatory trade disclosure, with each trade compulsorily revealed after it is executed, and before the next order can be placed. A small trader could use public disclosure as a lever to move the asset price and enhance pro…ts. Intuitively, while his orders do not a¤ect prices, their disclosure could. However, if he is constrained on asset holdings, for any properties of the asset value, even public disclosure has no price impact-in other words, it is correctly believed to be uninformative. To see what would happen otherwise, we consider a standard two-round trading model, and show that, if prices reacted somehow to disclosure (or its absence), when informed the trader would in probability deceive other market participants completely. Consequently, the market anticipates this behavior, ignoring disclosures, which makes our investor earn as much as under anonymity, where no signal is disclosed.
Indeed, only in some instances is a trader understood to possess private information just once, for contingent reasons. In general, because of his speci…c characteristics, he typically tends to be thought of as being in the position to acquire new private information again, at some (unknown, unless he is systematically informed with certainty) point in the future. To model this latter form of informational asymmetry, as in BL, we employ an in…nite-horizon repeated framework.
3 Focusing on a two-round repeated structure, suppose for instance that, at any point in time, current disclosures are believed to be informative-speci…cally, the disclosure of a purchase is known to push the price just as far up as a sale disclosure pushes it down-unless (recent) past disclosures moved prices away from the real value.
As long as disclosures are known to a¤ect current prices, at that repetition a trader that turns out to be informed may pick (or alternate between) one of the following two strategies. He may trade up to his maximum (which can but does not have to be common knowledge) to lead the price toward the right direction, earning as much as under anonymity, and subsequently pro…ting once again by reversing his position completely, in the same repetition, if the disclosure causes the price to overshoot the real value. Otherwise, he may mislead the market, trading in the opposite direction and reversing his position afterwards. The latter strategy-which in JN may be of equilibrium when the asset value distribution displays unequal mass below and above its mean-allows our trader to earn more than from leading in the current repetition, but only as much as under anonymity in the (next) future, when disclosures start to be ignored. Indeed, as in Allen and Gale's (1992) study, the market cannot determine if our investor is actually trading on information. Thus, when uninformed, he may manipulate, pretending to be informed-in jargon, blu¢ ng (Harris (2002))-that is, randomly disclosing that he has bought or sold, which moves the price up or down respectively, then reversing his initial position. This strategy-…rst examined in FH, where the trader manipulates whenever uninformed-in expectation allows the investor to earn more than from not trading in the current repetition; but, if prices are pushed by chance in the wrong direction, future pro…ts will be reduced. Hence, our trader may prefer to alternate between blu¢ ng and not trading, or choose the latter.
The solution to this problem brings to the identi…cation of three regions corresponding to di¤erent equilibria, in two of which disclosures are (at least partially) informative-the consequences being price shifts-and one where disclosures are not at all informative. Prices never shift when the weight granted to future pro…ts is small, as if they did, the trader would systematically mislead the market. Conversely, provided he weighs future pro…ts su¢ ciently, when (or as soon as) disclosures are believed to be informative, he prefers to lead the market whenever informed. Consequently prices react to disclosures. Speci…cally, the smaller the probability of acquiring information, the more he needs to weight future pro…ts to opt for a non-manipulative strategy when uninformed; otherwise prices react only partially-in proportion to how often he is informed-rather than fully, as he manipulates whenever uninformed. 4 Put di¤erently, there exists an equilibrium threshold in the likelihood that this trader is informed, which progressively increases as the weight given to future pro…ts shifts from high to medium. 5 For each discount factor associated with this band of inter-temporal preferences, as the probability that he acquires information increases, uninformed manipulations occur less often, up to this threshold, above which he switches behavior, never trading when uninformed. Thus, a trader who is less likely to be informed (e.g., investors not directly involved in the …rm's management) will manipulate, while one that is more likely to be informed (e.g., CEOs) will not.
Ever since Kyle (1985) , an important strain of literature has focused on an insider that with positive probability leads prices towards the real value, undertaking reversals in case his strategic signal (e.g., the order ‡ow, trade disclosure) causes the price to overshoot the privately known quotation. To model price overshooting, in principle every class of asset value properties is appropriate, other than that of a random variable with two possible realizations assumed in BL, FH, and JN, as these two priors would otherwise systematically bracket equilibrium prices. For tractability, however, this literature, which includes HHL, generally assumes normality. Instead, our predictions hold, whether or not the asset value distribution is continuous or (up to a certain degree) asymmetric, or its support unbounded. While overshooting is not due to the imprecision of the signal, the way the market interprets this signal plays a role. In fact, identical dynamics can be identi…ed, whether the trader has to disclose trade direction or size, because a market response is to interpret any trade of the same direction identically. It follows that, when disclosures are believed to be informative, if the investor trades, he only exchanges up to his (un)observable maximum, which justi…es the market reaction in question.
When (or as soon as) prices react to trade revelation, the investor expects to earn as much or more than he would without such a disclosure rule. Consequently, mandating disclosures is unnecessary, as informative trades will be advertised voluntarily. In detail, the trader decides to disclose not only when he knows that the resulting price will overshoot the privately known asset value, but also when it will undershoot this value (and thus no pro…table reversal is possible). By doing so, he hides this information at no cost, so that the price following a disclosure turns out to shift the most (that is, as much as under mandatory disclosure), which ensures the highest occurrence of price overshooting, and the most pro…table associated reversal. Clearly, an asset value distribution not preventing price overshooting is required to model voluntary disclosure of informative signals; otherwise, when informed, no small trader has an incentive to disclose.
Even when this investor cannot disclose certi…ed trades, in principle he may still publicly produce uncerti…ed announcements of any sort, provided he does not lie about relevant facts, which is forbidden under most regulations (e.g., SEC(2004) , Section 10(b)). In this case, when (or as soon as) announcements are believed to be favorable/unfavorable, the equilibrium price following their disclosure shifts as it does when a certi…ed purchase/sale turns out to be informative. This is why an investor that acquires new information repeatedly-whose equilibrium transactions coincide with those undertaken under the voluntary disclosure of certi…ed trades-has all the incentives to produce these announcements after the initial purchase/sale. Speci…cally, his incentive to lead the market when informed, as well as his incentive not to manipulate when uninformed, turn out to be una¤ected with respect to the case of a certi…ed trade disclosure. Thus, three analogous regions of equilibria exist, in one of which manipulations arise. Indeed, a question exists in literature, whether requiring investors to publicly certify their trades prevents them from producing manipulative announcements (BL, p. 947) . Our work suggests that, when mispricings are possible, this resolution makes traders indi¤erent about making announcements, but does not prevent equivalent trade-based manipulations.
pro…ts from reversals if undertaken within 6 months from the …rst trade. For any properties of the asset value, this rule implies fully informative disclosures: On the one hand, di¤erently from the case of an identical, …nite quantity exchangeable per trading-date, it ensures that our trader does not manipulate when uninformed. On the other, it discourages this trader, when informed, from attempting deceptive strategies-conversely he leads, exchanging only in the beginning. 7 To highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the US short-swing rule, which is imposed unconditionally, consider a trader who may acquire new inside information repeatedly. Even though in some instances this extra rule is ine¤ective-as deceptive strategies would have not been attempted anyhow-in others it prevents uninformed manipulation. However, there is an important drawback of SEC Section 16(b). In line with general concerns (Goldwasser (1999) , p.48), a resolution discouraging manipulations can deter appropriate trading. In detail, provided the trader weights future pro…ts heavily, the US short-swing rule is not only unnecessary but, when private information is su¢ ciently long-lived, also prevents the revelation of reversals (or of their absence), which would have shifted prices even closer to the fundamental value.
Pre-trade non-anonymity is a natural alternative to imposing trade disclosure. It consists of a public revelation of the forthcoming purchase or sale, together with the trader's identity, just before execution. A rule that forces (at least) the disclosure of the submitted order direction prevents the insider from trading in the market. This general result holds for any properties of the asset value and the noise traders'demand, and depends neither on the position limit to which the trader is subject, nor on whether he is small or large. Because the obligation to reveal orders before execution implies the lowest price e¢ ciency level, this measure may be preferable only when the objective is to prevent an insider from pro…ting at the expense of other investors. This paper continues as follows. Section I presents the assumptions. Section II studies the e¤ects of a regulation that, following each purchase or sale, mandates public disclosure of trade direction. Section III investigates the foundation of mandatory and voluntary trade disclosure. At the end of this section, the analysis is extended to the case of a voluntary production of announcements. Section IV focuses on market beliefs. Section V extends our analysis in di¤erent directions, including that of trade size disclosure. Section VI evaluates the short-swing rule and public pre-trade non-anonymity. Section VII concludes.
I. Assumptions
Trading is modelled as a sequence of auctions, structured to give the ‡avor of a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982) ). As in Kyle (1985) , a risky asset is exchanged for a riskless one among three kinds of traders. In a risk-neutral world, a potential insider (the leader, L) and noise traders submit orders to a market maker (M) , that sets prices and clears the market.
The ex-post liquidation value of the asset, v, is a random variable over [ b,b] , where b>0; v has zero mean; F ( v) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure; and f ( v) is symmetric (in Section III, the absolute continuity and symmetry requirements are relaxed).
The timing is the following. Before v is exogenously revealed to the market at the end of the period, a sequence of two rounds (or auctions), n 2 f1,2g, takes place. Round n consists of three steps. In Step 1, a public disclosure occurs; in Step 2, noise traders and L submit quantities (or orders); and in Step 3, the price is …xed and quantities are executed by M.
Two main states of the world are possible: s2 fI; U g. In I the leader has information about v, learning whether v>0 or v<0 in round n=1, and learning v=v in n=2. In U the leader does not know v at any round. State I occurs with probability q (for the case of a leader that, when informed, already observes v=v in round n=1, see Section V). From now on, for brevity, we refer to a potential insider as an insider when, in a speci…c period, he actually possesses private information about v; conversely, when he privately knows that s=U , we say that he is uninformed.
The market maker's task is to set the clearing price in round n, p n , e¢ ciently; thus p n is chosen to equal the asset expected value, conditional on the information available.
[See Fig. 1.] At auction n the leader trades a quantity x n , positive for a purchase, negative for a sale, and zero otherwise. The leader is constrained on asset holdings, in that he is restricted to hold
, where x L , the cap on total exposure, is strictly positive and …nite, and x 0 is normalized, without loss of generality, to 0.
8 Denote, with n =x n (v p n ), the portion of L's pro…ts attributable to the round n 2 f1; 2g trade, and assume that the intra-period discount factor equals 1. Noise traders' demand in n, the random variable u n , avoids the no-trade theorem problem (Milgrom and Stokey (1982) ); u n and v are independently distributed.
De…ne P and X, which are vectors of function, by P =hP 1 ; P 2 i and X=hX 1 ; X 2 i, where P is M's pricing rule, and X is L's trading strategy. In detail, p n =P n ( n ), where n is M's information set at auction n;
; and x 2 =X 2 ( v=v; s=s).
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is de…ned as: (i) A strategy by L that maximizes the overall sum of his discounted expected payo¤s over time, given the price setting rule and the information L has when making each trade; (ii) a strategy by M that allows him to set each price equal to the asset expected value, given L's strategy and the information available (market e¢ ciency condition); (iii) each player's belief about the other player's strategy is correct in equilibrium.
As a distinctive assumption in this model, the orders that the potential insider submits have no inferable impact on the order- ‡ow-in other words, public disclosure is the only information M conditions on. 9 To simplify the exposition, when this assumption holds, from now on we say (or imply, when not speci…ed) that the leader is small (as opposed to large). Let's also assume that, as soon as v=v is exogenously revealed at the end of the period, the price immediately adjusts, and that the initial price, p 0 , is normalized to E[ v]=0.
10
Mandatory post-trade non-anonymity (N ) characterizes markets in which, at the very beginning of round n, the identity of agents placing orders in n 1 and whether they bought or sold are revealed (post-trade disclosure of submitted quantities and pre-trade non-anonymity are considered in Section V and VI.B respectively). Thus in n=2 the signal 2 f 1; 0; 1g is released: =1 implies that L bought in n=1; = 1 implies a sale; =0 implies no revelation in n=2 about the purchase or sale that L undertook in n=1. When disclosure is mandated, this setting coincides with inactivity in n=1. Because 1 =f?g, 2 =f g, it follows that 8 Other authors, before us, have assumed a symmetric upper-and lower-bound in the change of holdings (e.g., van Bommel (2003) , Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) ).
9 Of the three ways, adduced in the introduction to this analysis, to justify a non-informative order- ‡ow, u n +x n , the …rst can be formalized with a distribution of u n , g( u n ), strictly positive for all u n 2 [ 1; 1], when 2x L is quantitatively negligible. Under this structure, E[x n j u n +x n ] E[x n j u n ]. The second-i.e., that of an indistinguishably large or low demand-with a naïve market maker with di¤use priors about u n : If g( u n ) is unknown, then E[x n j u n +x n ] cannot be computed. 10 We can think of p 0 being equal to E [ v] as an implicit consequence of the market e¢ ciency condition. This assumption does not play a role in the determination of any result in this work, in that no exchange takes place at the initial price. Nonetheless, it facilitates the exposition, allowing us to describe whether and how, within the same period, the prices set by M shift from this initial level. b; b] . Speci…cally, as long as trades get revealed after the order execution, price-driven markets-in which prices are set, then quantities placed and executed at this price-are equivalent to order-driven ones.
11 Anonymity (A) characterizes markets in which no information is released.
II. Markets with post-trade mandatory disclosure
This section analyzes a regulation mandating disclosure of trade direction, …rst considering the benchmark case of a non-repeated sequence of two auctions, then a multi-period framework where this sequence is repeated up to in…nite.
II.
A. Single-period equilibrium with post-trade mandatory disclosure Under A, in equilibrium the market clears at the same price, p n =0, at any auction. The equilibrium behavior of an insider aware of v>0 (or v<0) is such that P n x n equals x L (resp., x L )-in other words, such that he holds x L (resp., x L ) at the end of the period-while that of an uninformed leader is such that
This means that each type of leader can place any probability (also equal to 0 or 1) on all round n=1 trade quantities (x 1 =0 included), no matter what information he observes. For instance, consider a trader that in n=1 systematically buys (or sells, or does not trade) only when he observes v>0. Although in equilibrium M's beliefs about L's (pure or mixed) strategy are correct, absence of public signals-i.e., n =f?g-implies no price shift. At these prices, an uninformed leader is indi¤erent whether or not to trade at any round, as by purchasing or selling he earns 0 expected pro…ts.
Under N , in the standard two-round trading model, public trade disclosure by any small investor constrained on asset holdings is not informative. As under A, an initial trade by L does not a¤ect the short-run price, p 1 -that is, because 1 =f?g, M sets p 1 =p 0 =0. Although its subsequent public disclosure might alter the long-run price, p 2 , we show that in equilibrium M ignores any signal in the second round and sets p 2 =0.
Proposition 1 For mandatory trade disclosure, in the single period the 'unique beliefs'equilibrium is the following: M sets p n = 0; type s= I^ v>0 and s= I^ v<0 trade in such a way that P n x n = x L and P n x n = x L respectively, providing they disclose the same signal = with equal probability (even 0 or 1); type s= U trades in such a way that
Proof. See Internet Appendix A.
It follows that, both under A and N , the per-period equilibrium payo¤ of type s=U equals 0, while that of the insider of type v>0 (or v<0) equals x L , where =E [ vj v>0] .
To see why public disclosure of trades (as well as disclosure of no undertaken trade) is not informative, consider any candidate equilibrium pricing rule such that either the signal = 1 or =0 or =1 causes the price p 2 to shift from p n6 =2 =0. For each of these pricing rules, derive L's optimal response, under the assumption that, when informed, L already observes v=v in the …rst round. Holding this optimal trading strategy …xed, notice that the candidate pricing rule in question makes M reply to all types of insider belonging to either [ b; 0) or (0; b] with a price in the opposite partition of the support of v.
13 In particular, this wrong price shift follows an identical …rst round order, x 1 (and thus an identical disclosure of trade direction). Consequently, the optimal trading strategy is una¤ected when each of these types of insider only observes whether v<0 or v>0 in round n=1, which is why any of these candidate pricing rules still su¤ers from the same problem. Now recall that, since f ( v) is symmetric around 0, the probability of v being greater or smaller than p 0 is the same. It follows that any of these candidate pricing rules is (in expectation) wrong. In fact, at least half of the times, prices shift in the wrong partition of v, regardless of whether in n=1 an insider knows v=v or v? 0. In conclusion, no pricing rule such that p 2 6 = p 0 can be an equilibrium one.
Part of the result is in line with the one in …nitely repeated zero-sum games of incomplete information, in which it is impossible for the informed sender to mislead the uninformed receiver (Aumann and Maschler (1995) ). Less intuitively, in the single period M does not make any use of the signal received, because L's preferences over actions are completely opposed to what can be roughly de…ned as M's preferences, which are to set prices e¢ ciently. If prices somehow reacted to the trade disclosure (or its absence), the pricing rule would not be justi…ed, and in this sense, M would be worse o¤ and consequently would deviate. Otherwise, regardless of whether L actually possesses information, with probability greater than a half prices would move in the opposite direction with respect to v=v, and in practice, M could do better by tossing a coin. This is mainly due to the position limit assumption (see Section III).
With respect to the equilibrium trading strategy depicted under A, the one under N is constrained as follows. The probability that an insider of type v>0 and one of type v<0 place on round n=1 purchases is the same. Analogously, the probability that these types place on round n=1 sales is identical, as well as the probability placed on x 1 =0. In this way, they hide their information completely and the pricing rule p n =0 is justi…ed (in fact, even when type s=U signals di¤erently from what the informed types signal, M does not extract information from that). HHL shows that, when forced to disclose trades, a large insider dissimulates to reduce the revelation of his information. To do so, he plays a mixed strategy consisting of a …rst round trade that includes a random noise component. By contrast, in the present study the revelation of information following the …rst round trade is eliminated rather than reduced. To accomplish this, the insider can but does not have to employ mixed strategies, which is why dissimulation is not a driving force behind the present result. What matters is that any type of insider initially disregards his information and discloses (under probability) the same trade. By contradiction, suppose for example that the insider(s) of type v>0 decided to signal = 1 (or =0, or =1) less 13 The result does not depend on the e¤ective size of the cap on total exposure, x L . To make some o¤-the-path manipulative attempts by a leader more explicit, consider the following candidate equilibrium pricing rules and the associated insider's best responses. Holding p 1 =0 unchanged, …rst suppose that P 2 ( =1)-i.e., the price in response to a disclosed purchase-is positive, P 2 ( =0) is non-negative, and P 2 ( =1) is negative (this is case C3 in the proof to Proposition 1). The round n=1 placed orders in response to these prices, as well as the disclosed trade directions, depend on the exact value that P 2 ( = 1), P 2 ( =0), and P 2 ( =1) assume. Speci…cally, not every type initially aware of v=v>0 prefers to disclose a …rst round sale-which moves p 2 down, namely toward the wrong direction-unless both P 2 ( =1) and
are non-greater than jP 2 ( = 1)j. Nonetheless, when this latter condition on prices is not satis…ed, each type initially aware of v=v<0 …nds it optimal to purchase or not to trade in n=1 depending on whether P 2 ( =1)
respectively, which causes p 2 to increase, namely to shift in the wrong direction. Second, suppose for instance that P 2 ( = 1) is positive and P 2 ( =0) and P 2 ( =1) are non-positive (this is case C6 in the proof to Proposition 1). When the leader initially observes v=v<0, he …nds it optimal to sell a tiny quantity in n=1-so that p 2 shifts up, namely in the wrong direction-and to continue selling up to his total exposure cap in n=2. In particular, this latter strategy highlights how trading in the so-called 'wrong direction'-i.e., buying and selling in n when v<p n 1 and v>p n 1 respectively-is not necessary to qualify a best reply as a manipulative attempt.
often than the insider(s) of type v<0 do(es). For each of them, the optimal trading plan associated with this alternative signaling requirement implies a payo¤ that is equal to that achieved in equilibrium. However, this best reply is not an equilibrium response, because disclosure of a sale (resp., absence of disclosure; disclosure of a purchase) would shift p 2 down, a pattern which has been shown not to be compatible with that of an equilibrium pricing rule.
None of the equilibria in Proposition 1 is robust to a probability that M exogenously learns v=v at the end of the …rst rather than of the second auction. Even when this probability is small, an informed type is not indi¤erent any more about a …rst round trade or another. Instead, in response to p n =0, an insider of type v<0 prefers to sell in n=1, while one of type v>0 prefers to buy. These replies cause M to deviate. Speci…cally, because type s=U now prefers inactivity, M sets p 2 ( =0)=0 and p 2 ( =1)= p 2 ( = 1)= . At these new prices, however, a leader aware of v<0 (or v>0) buys (resp., sells) in n=1, which moves p 2 in the wrong direction, then reversing his initial position in the very likely event of an exogenous revelation of v=v to M only at the end of round n=2. In this case, it seems reasonable to improve our de…nition of equilibrium by adding a condition that makes M set prices e¢ ciently, in the weak sense, if no pricing rule is justi…ed otherwise. When this condition is added, since in equilibrium M turns out to be 'required'to ignore signals, and thus sets p n =0, an insider of type v<0 (or v>0) initially sells (resp., buys). Thus, although the equilibrium trading strategy in Proposition 1 probably lacks of realism, the associated equilibrium prices and payo¤s do not. Conversely, for any case studied in our work, other than that of a mere mandatory trade disclosure over a …nite horizon, this extra equilibrium condition will not be necessary, because of the existence of equilibria that display robustness to a small probability of v=v being exogenously available to M in advance.
II.B. Informative post-trade mandatory disclosure
This subsection investigates whether alternative equilibria are possible, where disclosed trades become relevant. We will allow for an in…nite repetition of the single period and refer to an equilibrium as a sequence of history-contingent replies that satisfy certain sequential conditions. When analyzing a problem with t 2 N periods (where N includes 0), additional assumptions are needed. First, an inter-period discount factor, 2 [0; 1), is assumed. In particular, and q are drawn by Nature at time t=0 (the only period in which L does not play), and do not vary over time. Second, the two active agents involved in the in…nite repetition are the same market maker and leader. L's type changes over time: Immediately after the exogenous revelation of v=v to the whole market at the end of period t (but before period t+1 starts), s and v are drawn again by Nature. Both s and v are i.i.d. over periods. Third, for any repetition of the two auctions, p 0 and x 0 are normalized to 0.
14 For an in…nite repetition of the two auctions, consider the following M's strategy.
De…nition 2 Suppose M's strategy is to set p 1 =0 and p 2 =P N 2 ( ) in the …rst period, where P N 2 : =1 ! p 2 = ; = 1 ! p 2 = ; =0 ! p 2 =0, and 0 is the magnitude of the second round price shift. At the second round of the t th period, if the outcome of all t 1 preceding periods has been =1^v>0 or = 1^v<0 or =0, then play P N 2 ; otherwise, set p 2 =0.
The analysis is now restricted to what, for >0, we call trigger strategy, which consists of a generic history-contingent pricing rule and a punishment scheme that makes M ignore subsequent disclosures if L defects-that is, when L causes the price to go in the wrong direction with respect to v. The punishment refers to the decrease in per-period expected pro…ts su¤ered by L after defection. Speci…cally, De…nition 2 implies that, as soon as M observes vp 2 <0-i.e., a price manipulation occurs-at period j, from period j+1 onwards prices at any auction equal 0. Consequently, from period j+1, L's equilibrium trading strategy coincides with that undertaken under N , when the two-round period is not repeated. Depending on , q, and f ( v), sub-classes of this trigger strategy are part of an equilibrium.
In particular, M can be thought of as representing the behavior of a semi-strong e¢ cient market as a whole (BL), or as serving as an intermediary. Finally, as in Kyle (1985) , M can be also interpreted as the reduced form of at least two competitive bidders per auction, where the winner-i.e., who posts the most attractive bid for L-clears the market at the winning price. In this case, to prevent multi-round collusion, Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010, p. 250) suggest imagining a large group of bidders, each of them bidding once and then quitting the market. Still, if prices were set by competitive bidders, a priori it is unclear whether a punishment strategy is implementable. Section IV explains why the notion of a unique market maker breaking even in expectation via the selection of any trigger strategy, and therefore even a Grim trigger-which applies a punishment consisting of M reverting to single period equilibrium behavior forever (see Friedman (1971) )-is consistent with the idea of bidders setting prices competitively. Section IV also accounts for the multiplicity of equilibrium pricing rules.
II.B.1. Benchmark case (q = 1) In general, a trader can alternate (with some probability, even 0 or 1) between trading some non-negative quantity in one direction and in the other. In this respect, providing at a certain period prices shift positively as stated in De…nition 2, if an insider decides to incur the punishment, we say that he misleads M. If an insider decides to push the price in the right direction, he leads M. De…ne, with M( ) and L( ), how much L expects to earn per period from trading optimally while aiming to mislead and lead respectively. These two new strategies identi…ed, let _ 2 [0; 1] be the probability with which he chooses the former rather than the latter.
Lemma 1 Consider mandatory disclosure of trades. Given the pricing rule in De…nition 2, by trading optimally a type s=I that decides to incur the punishment with probability
At each period, if an insider of type v>0 (or v<0) decides to lead, it is optimal for him to trade x 1 =x L (resp., x 1 = x L ), completely reversing this position afterwards by trading x 2 = 2x L (resp., x 2 =2x L ) in case v=v lies between p 2 and p 0 , or not trading at all otherwise. As long as is strictly positive, since the insider has the chance to bene…t from an additional price differential at the second round, the resulting per-period expected pro…ts are greater than those after defection-in other words, if >0, then L( )>x L . If this type decides to optimally mislead, he will initially sell (resp., buy) up to his cap on total exposure, always undertaking a complete reversal of the initial position afterwards. Only for =0 we have that M( )=L( )=x L , case in which any strategy such that P n x n equals x L (resp., x L ) is a best response. Given M's trigger strategy, a leader informed with certainty chooses a level of _ , _ I , which maximizes his discounted expected pro…ts over periods. In this case, whether to defect at a certain point in time only depends on how much the trader weighs future pro…ts.
Proposition 2 For mandatory disclosure of trades, an in…nite repetition of the two-round trading period, and a leader acquiring new information every period (that is, when q = 1):
, an equilibrium exists in which disclosures a¤ect prices. Speci…cally, M undertakes the strategy in De…nition 2, setting = ; L trades optimally in such a way that he never incurs the punishment. (ii) If < r , at each repetition the equilibrium coincides with that under N , when no repetition of the period takes place.
Consider a situation in which >0. When the insider gives substantial weight to the pro…ts from persistently leading the market optimally-an alternative to earning even more only once by misleading optimally, but then earning less forever-he opts for the former option with certainty. Thus, prices are not manipulated at the equilibrium, which is in pure strategies. In detail, disclosures being fully informative, an equilibrium price shift equal to is justi…ed. Conversely, when L does not weigh future pro…ts enough, he would always mislead. However, M anticipates such misleading behavior, ignoring disclosures by setting =0. As a consequence, L e¤ectively trades as he does in a single repetition of the two-round period.
Finally notice that, when = r , for any positive value of , insiders are indi¤erent towards leading and misleading optimally. In this case, depending on the probability with which each insider is believed to lead, in…nite other equilibrium outcomes are possible, with price shifts that can assume any value between 0-when both insiders are believed to mislead with probability greater than or equal to 1 2 -to included. Because r is a point in the continuum, we refer only to the more informative equilibrium.
II.B.2. Generalized case (q 2 (0; 1]): The manipulative-equilibrium threat Consider a leader that is not informed with certainty. Whenever uninformed, this trader cannot undertake any insider activity. Still, provided that, at a certain moment in time, prices positively shift as hypothesized in De…nition 2, with some probability the uninformed leader can pretend to be informed, that is, blu¤, disclosing a purchase or a sale to move p 2 up or down respectively. When he does so, by trading optimally he expects to earn P( ) in that period, whether he opts for an initial purchase or a sale. Let _ 2 [0; 1] be the probability with which the uninformed leader decides to blu¤ as opposed to not blu¢ ng, the latter strategy implying no trade undertaken in the …rst auction.
In case 6 = 0, an uninformed leader that decides to blu¤ …nds it optimal to either buy or sell initially up to the cap on total exposure and completely reverse this position afterwards.
For an uninformed leader that decides to blu¤, let _ z2 [0; 1] be the probability with which this type decides to do so by disclosing a purchase as opposed to disclosing a sale. Holding the price reaction in De…nition 2 …xed, he is indi¤erent to the two options. In fact, because of the symmetry of the pricing rule, the associated per-period payo¤s are identical. In addition, because of the symmetry of the punishment scheme and of f ( v), when 6 = 0, this choice does not even impact on the likelihood that type s=U accidentally causes the price to be wrong-an event that occurs with probability _ 2 . However, for this symmetric pricing rule to be justi…ed, beliefs in response to a purchase and a sale are restricted to assigning the same probability to type s=U . For this reason, if L blu¤s at the equilibrium, he chooses
If type s=U does not blu¤, then x 1 =0. No matter what his unobservable round n=2 trade is, this type expects to earn 0 per-period pro…ts, that is less than P( ) whenever 6 = 0. Only for =0 we have that P( )=0, case in which any strategy such that P n x n =0 is a best response.
Lemma 2 Consider mandatory disclosure of trades. Given the pricing rule in De…nition 2, by trading optimally a type s=U that decides to blu¤ with probability _ -i.e., to defect with probability
When q is not restricted to equal 1, another dimension is added to the problem presented in the previous subsection. At any period in which prices are expected to shift, L can randomize with probability _ (or _ ) between misleading and leading (resp., blu¢ ng and not blu¢ ng) optimally when informed (resp., uninformed). In the subsequent period, this choice causes prices to shift again with probability 1 _ (resp., 1 _ 2 ). As long as 6 = 0, choosing _ 6 = 0 or _ 6 = 0 implies a positive probability of incurring the punishment, taken into account when determining L's optimal strategy at the equilibrium, for every 2 [0; 1) and q 2 (0; 1).
Consider a leader that is informed with probability q. The inter-temporal problem that he has to solve di¤ers depending on whether or not in the current period-that is, period t=1-he possesses private information. Given M's trigger strategy, let _ I and
) be the levels of _ and _ that maximize E I (resp., E U ), that is the discounted sum of pro…ts that L expects to earn over time when in period t=1 he is (resp., is not) informed.
The next lemma de…nes L's best response.
Lemma 3 Consider mandatory trade disclosure, an in…nite repetition of periods, and a leader that acquires new information every period with probability q 2 (0; 1). Given the pricing rule in De…nition 2, identify the pairs _ I ;
and
In the current period, the best response of a leader of type s= I (or s= U ) is _ I (resp., _ U ) when 6 = 0, and equals to the one in the single repetition of the period otherwise.
Derivation of S in Lemma 3. See Appendix.
The function S embeds the following elements. The leader does not know whether he will be informed at each future date but knows that at any date he will have learned whether he possesses new private information before signaling. In the decision process, L accounts for the probability of acquiring new information, how much he weighs future pro…ts, and the consequences of each signal on the direction of present and future price shifts. 15 The next lemma de…nes the level of at which the pricing rule in De…nition 2 is e¢ cient.
Lemma 4 Consider mandatory trade disclosure, an in…nite repetition of periods, and a leader that in every period acquires new information with probability q and trades optimally given the pricing rule in De…nition 2. The market e¢ ciency condition holds for =1(
, where 1( ) is the indicator function.
Before defection, beliefs formed in response to disclosed trades (or absence of disclosure) account directly for the current and indirectly for the planned choices by a leader aware about prices being restricted to shift as prescribed in De…nition 2. Disclosures are informativethat is, is positive-only if a trader that is currently informed leads with probability greater than 1 2
. In this case, provided L does not blu¤ when currently uninformed, a level of equal to 1 2 _ I ensures e¢ cient pricing. This level has to be reduced-i.e., multiplied
U -in case L blu¤s with positive probability when uninformed. Below we propose the closed-form solution to the general problem in markets with mandatory post-trade disclosure. More general conditions for this result to hold are presented in Corollary 3. In the next section the result is extended, and commentary provided.
Proposition 3 For mandatory disclosure of trades and an in…nite repetition of the tworound period, three regions over the space in 2 [0; 1) and q 2 (0; 1] can be identi…ed. They correspond to di¤erent equilibria in which M undertakes the strategy in De…nition 2. In detail, (1) if (q; = ), in every period M sets = , and L plays
< (q; = ), M sets = q , and L plays _ I = 0, _ U = 1 up to the j th repetition, where j is the …rst period after which M observes vp 2 <0; and (3) if <r(q; = q ), at each repetition the equilibrium coincides with that under N , when no repetition of the period takes place. Speci…cally, (q; ) =
For any distribution of v satisfying the initial conditions, these three regions always exist.
When L repeatedly acquires information with probability q 2 (0; 1], the equilibrium is derived as follows. Holding >0 …xed, notice that: (1) For (q; >0), the pairs _ I =0;
and _ U =0; _ U =0 maximize the functions E I and E U respectively. Thus, L's best response consists of leading when informed and not trading otherwise. For
=0, a level of equal to guarantees price e¢ ciency. Holding = …xed, L does not deviate from the original strategy. Consequently, when (q; = ), in equilibrium disclosures are fully informative and no manipulation arises. (2) For r(q; >0) (q; >0), the pairs _ I =0;
I and E U respectively. Hence, L's best reply is to lead when informed and blu¤ when uninformed. For _ I =0; _ U =1, a level of equal to q guarantees price e¢ ciency. At this level of , no deviation by L from the initial strategy occurs. It follows that: 15 For a leader that is currently informed (or uninformed), his best response today, _ I (resp.,
), coincides with his best planned response when informed (resp., uninformed) tomorrow. The assumption of an insider learning only about v>0 or v<0 (rather than v=v) in round n=1 simpli…es the analysis. Otherwise, the multiperiod problem of a leader that is currently informed-but not that of one that is currently uninformed-is a¤ected (see Section V.B.2 for details).
(2.a) When q=1 and r(q=1; = ) (q=1; = ), since no manipulation occurs, disclosures are again fully informative. (2.b) When q<1 and r(q<1; =q ) (q<1; = ), disclosures are partially informative until a manipulative attempt causes prices to shift in the wrong direction, an event that occurs by the end of the k th period with probability 1 ( 1+q 2 ) k .
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(3) For r(q; >0), the arguments maximizing the two functions do not always coincide. This has no implications for L's strategic behavior because
shifted, L would always mislead the market as soon as he is informed. In equilibrium, M ignores disclosures and L trades as he does in the single period. Notice that, over the segment = (q<1; >0)^q<1 (or =r(q; >0)), any pair
is also a leader's best reply. In this case, in…nite equilibria are possible, where the price shift varies from =q to = (resp., from =0 to =q ). In line with the argument presented below Proposition 2, we refer only to the most informative one.
The three regions identi…ed in Proposition 3 always exist. In fact, the functions r(q; ) and (q; ) are continuous and r(q=1; = )< (q=1; = ). In particular, r (q=1; = )= r (as shown in the benchmark case), lim q!0 (q; = ) ! 1, and For any q<1, whenever assumes values just below (q<1; = ), the potential insider continues leading when informed, but starts blu¢ ng when uninformed. This is due to the fact that, for any pair and q 2 (0; 1) and a positive , the overall incentive that an informed leader has to mislead (rather than lead) optimally today is smaller than the one that the same leader has to blu¤ (rather than not to blu¤) optimally today when uninformed. On the one hand, per period the extra-payo¤ from misleading optimally, [M( ) L( )], is smaller than that from blu¢ ng optimally, [P( ) 0].
17 On the other, while a misleading strategy implies a punishment with certainty, a blu¢ ng strategy implies a defection only with probability 1 2 . Hence, starting from any pair and q 2 (0; 1) associated with a non-manipulative outcome, by gradually decreasing , at some point a switch in the equilibrium occurs, to one where L has no incentive to mislead, but has incentive to blu¤.
III. Foundation of mandatory/voluntary disclosure
First we focus on mandatory and voluntary trade disclosure, then extend the study to the voluntary disclosure of (uncerti…ed/non-factual) announcements.
III.A. Voluntary vs. mandatory trade disclosure
To study the foundation of mandatory and voluntary trade disclosure, and highlight the role of the position limit to which L is subject, together with the role of the asset value properties, we start with a comparison with FH. The corollaries refer to a leader constrained on asset holdings.
In FH, for a disclosure to be forthcoming, it must be mandatory, the reason being that disclosures reduce the informed trader's pro…ts. Given the single period made of n 2 f1; 2g rounds, where p 0 =0, suppose that a negligible leader, informed with probability q, can trade a 16 For k=1, the probability of a defection equals = 1 q 2 . For k=2, it equals + (1 ), that is the probability of defection today plus that of a defection in period t=2, provided a punishment has not yet occurred. By the end of period t=k a defection occurs with probability + (1 ) + ::
(divisible) unit x L per round, and that v2 f b; bg has equally likely priors. 18 Under mandatory disclosure, when L initially sells (or buys), at the equilibrium p 1 =0 and p 2 = bq (resp., p 2 =bq). At these prices, an insider aware of v<0 (or v>0) sells (resp., purchases) x L twice, which is a trading strategy that, however, is less pro…table than under A. Conversely, type s=U randomizes with equal probability between trading
Because the informed trader's loss from disclosure equals in magnitude the uninformed trader's gain, L's ex-ante payo¤ is higher with disclosure if q< 1 2 . Conversely, in our model, under mandatory trade disclosure, the per-period payo¤ of any type of leader is equal or greater than under A. Speci…cally, provided disclosures a¤ect prices, the expected pro…ts of an informed leader are always higher. Thus, if L were to choose in which market to exchange, N or A, he would always at least weakly prefer the former.
Corollary 1 When disclosed trades a¤ect equilibrium prices, the leader prefers a system mandating disclosure to A, and is indi¤erent otherwise. Now, let's consider a market in which L can voluntarily decide whether or not to disclose an undertaken purchase or sale. Since in this market the signal =0 is more opaque than when disclosures are mandatory, the conditions for an equilibrium with informative trades to exist are clearly harder to satisfy. Nonetheless, within the in…nitely repeated structure, equilibria exist where the leader voluntarily discloses trades that shift prices.
Corollary 2 For voluntary trade disclosure, in the single period a unique beliefs equilibrium exists, where type s=I^ v>0 and s=I^ v<0 disclose the same signal with equal probability, trading in such a way that P n x n =x L and P n x n = x L respectively; type s=U attaches any probability to any signal, trading in such a way that
; and p n =0. When the period is in…nitely repeated, alternative equilibria exist, where M undertakes the strategy in De…nition 2. Speci…cally, if (q, = ), type s=I^ v>0 (or s=I^ v<0, or s=U ) signals =1 (resp., 1; 0), while M sets = . If r(q, =q ) < (q, = ), up to the j th repetition, any type s=I signals and trades as before; with equal probability, type s=U signals as type s=I^ v>0 and s=I^ v<0 do, trading x 1 =x L ,x 2 = 2x L and x 1 = x L ,x 2 =2x L respectively; and M sets =q ; from period j+1 on, the equilibrium coincides with that in the single repetition of the period.
As far as the single period is concerned, no equilibrium exists such that prices at the second round shift following the voluntary disclosure of an undertaken transaction (or its absence). To see it, consider any of these o¤-the-path pricing rules and derive the optimal response from a leader that observes v=v already in round n=1 and can-but does not have to-disclose trades. Given this leader's best response, M turns out to reply to at least half of the types of insiders-those below or those above 0-with prices that shift in the wrong direction. For the same reasons adduced for the case of a mandatory disclosure, the pricing rule in question is not justi…ed, no matter whether an insider observes v? 0 or v=v in the …rst round. In equilibrium, unlike mandatory disclosure, the probability that an insider of type v>0 and one of type v<0 place on a round n=1 purchase (or sale; or absence of disclosure) does not necessarily have to be the same. Nonetheless, the probability that these types signal =1 (or 1, or 0) is identical-and can take any value from 0 to 1 (included)-so that the information revelation is eliminated and the pricing rule p n =0 is justi…ed. Indeed, holding this latter pricing rule …xed, by trading as prescribed in equilibrium but signaling di¤erently, each type of insider earns identical pro…ts. However, they do not opt for any of these alternative strategies, since this would cause M to deviate and set an o¤-the-path pricing rule. Finally, consider those equilibria where no disclosure ever occurs and x 1 equals x L or x L or 0 when s=I^ v>0 or s=I^ v<0 or s=U respectively. These equilibria are robust to a small probability that M exogenously learns v=v at the end of the …rst rather than of the second round.
Within the in…nitely repeated structure, when L weighs future pro…ts su¢ ciently, alternative equilibria exist, where until defection (if any) prices and (voluntary) disclosures-as a function of the state of the world-are identical to those set in Proposition 3. The reason for this is that the 'relevant payo¤ structure'
19 coincides with that analyzed when disclosures are mandatory. Suppose that, at a speci…c period, >0, and consider an insider who is aware, for instance, of v>0 (the case in which he is aware of v<0 is symmetric). If this trader does not aim to incur the punishment, he can choose between two options, disclosing a purchase (which requires him to submit an initial buy order) or not disclosing any trade (which does not prevent him from placing either a buy or a sell order). Clearly, the former option is better, provided the insider buys up the maximum in the …rst round and subsequently reverses the initial position if v<p 2 . By doing so, he expects to earn L( >0) in that period. Conversely, the only way this insider has to incur the punishment is to sell initially and disclose the undertaken sale. In particular, by trading optimally-selling as much as possible in round n=1 and buying back up to the total exposure cap in n=2-he expects to earn M( >0). Finally, an uninformed leader can pretend to be informed, disclosing either an undertaken purchase or sale. In either case, by trading optimally, he expects to earn P( >0) in that period. Alternatively, type s=U can avoid disclosure, which assures him that he will not incur the punishment at the end of the period. In this case, no matter what the quantity traded in each of the two rounds is, he expects to earn 0 pro…ts. For this reason, while for r(q, =q ) < (q, = ) the pre-defection equilibrium trading outcome (as a function of the states of the world) coincides with that in Proposition 3, for (q, = ), type s=U can trade di¤erently. From a regulatory perspective, the model suggests that it is not essential to impose public disclosure, as long as an investor with a cap on total exposure can voluntarily communicate trades. This result relies on general asset value properties, generalized even further below. Conversely, the length of punishment plays no role: The trader discloses voluntarily simply because he always earns at least as much as he does under A, both when informed and uninformed. Voluntary dissemination of information results from the investor's will to communicate trades, which reveals a link to the literature on uncerti…ed/non-factual messages.
The next corollary highlights which asset value properties drive the results obtained so far, when L is constrained on asset holdings. To explain the corollary, we consider a situation where disclosures are mandatory and present, in sequence, two examples that refer to a symmetric distribution of v, centered around 0 (an event which, for the time being, is assumed not to be possible). The …rst example helps our understanding of the second, in which speci…c conditions on f ( v) for an informed type to send meaningful signals are identi…ed.
The distinguishing feature of the …rst example is that, whenever L turns out to be informed about v>0 (or v<0), he is forced to exchange x 1 =x L (resp., x 1 = x L ). Whether the two-round period is repeated or not, in equilibrium type s=U (who has not been constrained in the direction of the initial trade) randomizes with equal probability between trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L and x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L . Because in this example the disclosure by an informed type is indirectly assumed to be informative, the equilibrium price p 2 following a purchase (resp., sale) shifts to q (resp., q ), a value that allows type s=U to achieve a positive payo¤-rather than 0, which is how much this type gets under A-from a reversal. In other words, the …rst round equilibrium orders by any type of leader and equilibrium prices coincide with those in FH. Nonetheless, and di¤erent from FH, mandatory disclosure allows an informed leader to earn either more than or as much as what he earns when disclosures are concealed, depending on the asset value properties. To see this, de…ne, with r>0, the realization of v that is closest to 0 from the right. When f ( v) is such that q r, rather than undertaking an unpro…table reversal, the insider prefers not to trade in n=2, which is why his per-period payo¤ equals that achieved under A. Conversely, when r<q , any insider aware of jvj<jq j reverses the initial position, earning more than under A.
The second example refers to a leader who is not forced to undertake any particular action in any …rst round. When (q, = ), at a speci…c period, if he turns out to be informed (or uninformed), he expects to earn more than (resp., as much as) under A, provided that disclosures are believed to be informative and at the same time f ( v) is such that r< . This latter condition ensures that L has an incentive to lead, in that those types of insider aware of <v<0 (resp., 0<v< ) increase their pro…ts by reversing the initial position in n=2, exchanging at a price P 2 ( = 1)= (or P 2 ( =1)= ). Speci…cally, any symmetric distribution of v is such that the latter types …nd the reversal pro…table, unless v2 f b; bg, in which case the reversal does not generate any additional revenue and thus there is no incentive to lead. When r(q; =q ) < (q; = ), at a speci…c period, any type of leader expects to earn more than under A, provided disclosures are believed to be informative and f ( v) is such that r<q , a condition that allows any insider to increase his pro…ts by reversing his initial leading position, exchanging at a price P 2 ( = 1)= q (or P 2 ( =1)=q ), whenever he learns about q <v<0 (resp., 0<v<q ). However, in this case the existence of two possible realizations of v above (or below) 0 does not guarantee that the condition r<q is satis…ed. The intuition proposed in this second example is generalized here.
Corollary 3 Relax the assumptions of a symmetric f ( v) and a F ( v) being absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure, and consider v2V < such that E[ v] is normalized to 0 and:
R2 : Pr( < v<0)= Pr(0< v< )6 = 0;
where b= min v 2V, b= max v 2V, and equals (or q ) if (q, = ) (resp., r(q, =q ) < (q, = )). Under restrictions from R1 to R4, all the preceding results still hold. In particular, those in the single period only require R1 to be satis…ed.
Notice that jbj does not have to equal b. More generally, as is clear from R3 and R4, even for the results in the in…nitely repeated framework, a symmetric f ( v) is no longer required. R1 has two implications. On the one hand, it ensures an equal probability mass above and below E [ v] , a restriction that is su¢ cient to guarantee that the results in the single period hold. For instance, the proof to Proposition 1 relies neither on the support of v being continuous, nor on the number of types of insider above and below p 0 being equal, nor on the speci…c distance between each type of insider and 0, nor on whether a realization of v above (or below) 0 is more likely than another realization lying on the same side of the support. On the other hand, R1 implicitly tells us that v=0 is either a zero-probability event or simply not possible, depending on whether or not the support of v is continuous around the initial price. This ensures that, whenever informed, a leader is clearly aware whether the fundamental value is above or below 0. In this way, in the in…nitely repeated framework, no ambiguity arises about whether a signal pushed the market price in the wrong direction or not. For the results in Proposition 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2 to hold, R2 is necessary to ensure that the investor has an incentive to lead. In fact, when this restriction holds, he can earn more than under A whenever he learns about <v<0 and 0<v< by reversing the initial position in the second auction, exchanging at a price equal to P 2 ( = 1)= and P 2 ( =1)= respectively. R2 implicitly requires the existence of at least four distinguishable realizations of v, two greater than 0, and two smaller. Speci…cally, for r(q, =q ) < (q, = ) (or (q, = )), at least one realization of v has to lie somewhere over both ( q ; 0) and (0; q ) (resp., ( ; 0) and (0; )). When R2 is satis…ed, it follows that at least one realization of v is lying somewhere over both [b; ] and [ ; b]. On the contrary, the results in the single period holds even when only two realizations, one greater and one smaller than p 0 , are possible. Finally, R2 -R4 ensure that an insider aware of v<0 and one aware of v>0 achieve the same payo¤ from leading (or misleading).
III.B. Voluntary production of (un)favorable announcements
In this subsection we consider the disclosure of messages, voluntarily selected and sent at no cost, when the market is able to interpret any sort of signal in (up to) three distinctive ways, whatever meaning is assigned to each di¤erent class of messages-that is, no matter what the beliefs following a message belonging to one speci…c class or another are.
Di¤erent from the voluntary (but truthful) disclosure of trades-in which case the following exogenously …xed mapping exists: 'L buys in n=1'! =1; 'L sells in n=1'! = 1-a priori uncerti…ed/non-factual messages are not associated with any transaction undertaken. Hence, their disclosure is equivalent to the disclosure of non-necessarily truthful trades.
Consider a leader that, at the beginning of the t th -period second action, sends a message i;m 2 m , m 2 f 1; 0; 1g, where i;m is a priori not correlated with any unobservable trade, is the universe of non-costly (verbal or non-verbal) messages, m \ :m =? and m 6 = ?. In particular, inactivity by a leader that decides not to send any message is a signal per se. The corollary below de…nes equilibria when uncerti…ed/non-factual messages are sent. When the single period is not repeated, signals are never informative. This is because, given a pricing rule with prices that react somehow to a speci…c signal or another, and L's associated best response, the pricing rule in question turns out to be wrong in expectation. Conversely, within an in…nitely repeated framework, signals can become informative, as long as a clear punishment scheme is de…ned. Here, suppose that M's trigger strategy is to set p 1 =0, p 2 ( i;1 )= p 2 ( i; 1 )= 0 0, and p 2 ( i;0 )=0 in the …rst period. Suppose also that, at any subsequent period, if the outcome of all the preceding periods has been either i;1^v >0 or i; 1^v <0 or i;0 , M continues playing as he did before, and sets p n =0 otherwise.
Corollary 4 Consider a market where uncerti…ed/non-factual messages are publicly sent. Under R1, in the single period a unique beliefs equilibrium exists, where type s=I^ v>0 and s=I^ v<0 disclose the same signal i;m with equal probability, trading in such a way that P n x n =x L and P n x n = x L respectively; type s=U attaches any probability to any signal, trading in such a way that
; and p n =0. When the period is in…nitely repeated, under R1-R4, alternative equilibria exist. Speci…cally, if (q, = ), type s=I^ v>0 (or s=I^ v<0, or s=U ) signals i;1 (resp., i; 1 ; i;0 ) and trades optimally in such a way that
, up to the j th repetition, any type s=I signals and trades as before; with equal probability, type s=U signals as type s=I^ v>0 and s=I^ v<0 do, trading x 1 =x L ,x 2 = 2x L and x 1 = x L ,x 2 =2x L respectively; and M sets 0 =q ; from period j+1 on, the equilibrium coincides with that in the single repetition of the period.
Predictably, in the single period, prices do not react to messages. Recall that the market is not only unable to condition on trades that are disclosed voluntarily. It also cannot extract meaningful information when trades are mandated, in which case no discretion other than that on the trade to be made is left to the investor. Thus, when none of the messages is tied to a speci…c transaction, the general result cannot be other than con…rmed. In particular, all the equilibria where, in the …rst auction, an insider aware of v>0 (or v<0) purchases (resp., sells) x L and an uninformed leader does not trade display robustness to a small probability that M exogenously learns v=v at the end of the …rst rather than of the second round.
Within the in…nitely repeated structure, as long as signals are believed to be informative, a leader that weighs future pro…ts enough …nds it optimal to send messages that push the market price in the right direction whenever informed, at the same time trading in a way that maximizes his pro…ts. In fact, a justi…able price shift 0 >0 allows an informed trader to earn more than under anonymity any time the fundamental value turns out to lie between the equilibrium price p 2 and the starting price p 0 . Only when the signal i;1 (or i; 1 ) in expectation conveys information concerning an increase (resp., decrease) of the asset fundamental value, we can call this message favorable (resp., unfavorable). Clearly, the notion of consistent rather than truthful behavior (or signal) should be adopted.
With reference to van Bommel's (2003) study, which is often cited when referring to a trader that spreads rumors (e.g., Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) ), the structure proposed herein is more general, and allows for several innovative existence results. Indeed, the two models in van are more a characterization of a pure strategy equilibrium rather than a proof of existence and for di¤erent reasons they are not quite right. The present work contributes to the literature by reconducting them to a unique problem and establishing a …rmer foundation for the issue of information-based manipulations (see Internet Appendix B).
IV. Robustness (Part I): Market beliefs
Within the in…nitely repeated structure, an unlimited number of alternative trigger strategies can be part of an equilibrium. For the same pair and q, on the one hand, the way prices shift following the same disclosures can di¤er; on the other, equilibria exist where, at some point following a defection, prices can start shifting again. Internet Appendix C proposes a guided tour through the wide universe of multiple equilibria, listing …ve minimal restrictions on beliefs such that, if any price shift at period t occurs in equilibrium, the way this price reacts in response to a speci…c signal or another, disclosed at period t, is unique-we term this result 'price-shift uniqueness'-and equal to q or in magnitude, depending on whether r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) or (q; = ) respectively. Below we underline how the equilibrium prices that the unique market maker sets when breaking even by selecting a trigger strategy-no matter whether supported by a speci…c punishment scheme or another-coincide with those set by competitive bidders, and that this result directly follows from the third equilibrium condition, the one on beliefs.
IV.A. Competition and punishment equivalent bidding outcomes
Even the winning price resulting from competition among bidders can turn out to be in some sense the punishment equivalent to L's intrinsic misbehavior against past bidders. To see it, rather than a unique M, consider a set of at least two competitive bidders per auction, bidding once and then quitting. In this context, the following needs to be spelled out. First, in de…ning the equilibrium, a strategy by each bidder that maximizes his expected payo¤ is required, in alternative to the market e¢ ciency condition. Second, bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have the same initial beliefs conditional on past history. Third, because each bidder trades only once, in the context of an in…nite repetition of the period, no discount factor is considered when computing his realized payo¤. Nonetheless, each bidder cares about past and future history, and about , which a¤ects L's signaling strategy over time.
Clearly, at a speci…c (per-period second) round, the only initial beliefs that always turn out to be con…rmed in equilibrium, independently of future beliefs, are those about any history of disclosures that are not informative at that round.
Still, any equilibrium achievable with a single market maker that breaks even in expectation can also be achieved when competitive bidders come to play. For instance, consider a pair and q which is such that an equilibrium Grim trigger supports pre-defection informative disclosures. When competitive bidders are taken into account, an equilibrium exists, where they set prices identical to those o¤ered by a unique M selecting the Grim trigger in question. This equilibrium exists because of the awareness all players share about post-defection prices being set by bidders who disregard disclosures, which justi…es pre-defection beliefs and equilibrium prices. More in general, given the de…nition of equilibrium employed herein, it is the awareness of what future bidders may or may not believe-and therefore about any implied punishment equivalent bidding strategy by those bidders competing over future prices-that supports equilibrium responses by current bidders, when the latter believe that the history of disclosure currently observed is somehow informative.
V. Robustness (Part II): Private information arrival and trade size disclosure
This section discusses alternative versions of our model, with a potential insider constrained on asset holdings. The following assumptions are relaxed: (1) A public disclosure about the direction of trade, but not its size; (2) a quality improvement (from each …rst to second round) in the private information possessed by an informed leader.
We show that equilibria exist, the outcomes of which are in line to those derived so far. By twisting the …rst assumption, our structure is su¢ cient to account for the full range of consequences that the following four regulations-which are alternatives to the mandatory or voluntary disclosure of trade direction-imply: Mandatory trade size disclosure; voluntary disclosure of trade size when trade direction cannot be revealed separately; voluntary trade size disclosure when revelation of trade direction is mandatory; voluntarily disclosure of either trade direction or trade size or nothing.
The second assumption is relaxed by analyzing a leader that, when informed, observes v=v from the …rst auction. Even in this case, the model is such that an equilibrium characterization can be made, both when examining a market in which the disclosure of trades is regulated (in one of the six ways listed above) and when studying uncerti…ed/non-factual announcements.
Speci…cally, an analysis that focuses on two auctions per period is enough to understand the implications of a framework that, depending on the case, allows the trader to choose between a number of signals that is either equal, greater, or smaller than the number of possible realizations of s and v observed by the leader in the …rst auction. When the single repetition of the period is taken into account, this result is presented under the more general assumption of a non-speci…ed but …nite number of auctions.
V.A. Single repetition of the period
This subsection considers a period made of any …nite sequence of auctions, n 2 f1; ::; N g, where the leader's trading strategy, X=hX 1 ; ::; X N i, is such that v=v; s=s) , to highlight that, for any nondegenerate random variable v2V, and no matter whether in the …rst round an insider learns only v? 0 or v=v, a unique beliefs equilibrium exists, where M ignores disclosures, setting p n2f1;::;N g , the price at each auction, equal to 0.
For what concerns the revelation of certi…ed trades, this result holds for any combination of provision for order direction and order size disclosure considered in this work. At the equilibrium, in each of the …rst N 1 rounds, any insider aware of v>0 (or v<0) trades in such a way that P n x n =x L (resp.,
, provided at round n 2 f1; ::; N 1g he sends a signalobservable with a round of delay-which is (under probability) identical to the one that any other type of insider would send at the same round. Conversely, any sequence of signals can be part of the uninformed leader's equilibrium strategy, which is such that
Provided at the same round all types of insider send the same signal with equal probability (even 0 or 1), this result holds even when L can only produce uncerti…ed/non-factual messages (a priori uncorrelated with the undertaken trade) at any step of any round, that is, even when these messages becomes publicly observable in n=1.
To see why these equilibria exist, suppose that M believes that signals are not informative. As a consequence, at each auction he will ignore them and set the price p n2f1;::;N g equal to E[ v], which we normalize to 0. Holding this pricing rule …xed, note that, at any round but the last one, each type of leader is indi¤erent about exchanging one quantity or another (even 0), provided he trades optimally in round N . The reason being that, for each of these typesbut not, of course, among types-the per-period payo¤ associated to any of these alternative sequences of transactions is identical. In particular, each of these trading plans is (part of) a best reply, in that it is not possible to earn more otherwise. It follows that, when all types of insider signal identically, the pricing rule is justi…ed.
V.B. In…nite repetition of the period
We examine an in…nitely repeated two-round period. To ease exposition, we refer below to a real asset value, v, whose properties are those de…ned in Section I and, for what concerns any regulation about public trade disclosure, to symmetric Grim triggers with the following three main characteristics. (1) At each second round before defection, (1.a) the function P 2 is identical and such that the revelation about a purchase (or about a speci…c purchased quantity) causes a positive price shift that equals in magnitude the negative shift following the revelation about a sale (resp., about an identical quantity, when sold); (1.b) when the regulation mandates (or allows for) trade size revelation, P 2 is non-decreasing in the disclosed quantity x 1 ; (1.c) absence of any disclosure causes the price not to shift; (2) L is thought of as defecting when, at the end of a certain period, it happens that p 2 v<0; and (3) as soon as a defection is observed, M punishes by reverting to single period equilibrium behavior forever. When appropriate, the implications of alternative Grim punishment schemes will be analyzed. Speci…cally, since we are dealing with Grim triggers, we only refer to L's strategy and M's pricing rule before defection (if any).
V.B.1. Trade size disclosure when the insider learns information gradually Consider an insider that in the …rst round observes v? 0, and learns v=v only in the second.
When mandatory/voluntary trade size disclosure is taken into account, the following four regulations can be identi…ed. For each of them, at least one equilibrium with informative disclosures exists, whose outcome in terms of traded quantities (as a function of the states of the world) and prices (as a function of traded quantities) is identical to that proposed in Proposition 3, where a regulation that imposes disclosure of trade direction but conceals trade size was examined. Further details about the equilibria in question are presented below.
First, let's consider mandatory trade size disclosure (or voluntary disclosure of trade size when trade direction cannot be revealed separately, in which case the signal x 1 =0 implies absence of disclosure), and focus on pre-punishment pricing rules such that, at the second round of each period, P 2 (x 1 )= P 2 ( x 1 ) 0. For r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) (or (q; = )), an equilibrium exists where P 2 (x 1 =x L ) equals , which we de…ned in Corollary 3. Speci…cally, for an argument in line with that produced when studying the voluntary disclosure of trade direction (see Section III), even when the regulation allows for the sole voluntary disclosure of trade size, in equilibrium L reveals undertaken purchases and sales.
Second, let's consider a regulation that allows for a voluntary trade size disclosure when revelation of trade direction is mandatory (or a regulation that allows the voluntary disclosure of either trade direction or trade size or nothing)-the consequences being that the signal f =0; x 1 =0g implies no e¤ective exchange (resp., no revelation about any trade undertaken) in n=1, and f 6 = 0; x 1 =0g implies no trade size revelation-and focus on a per-period prepunishment pricing rule P
, which maps the pair = ; x 1 =0 in the same way as the function P N 2 does with = , and which is such that P
x 1 =0) both equal . Before defection, each type of insider is indi¤erent whether or not to disclose trade size (resp., between the mere disclosure of trade direction and the revelation of trade size, two alternatives that are both preferred to absence of disclosure). In equilibrium, a leader that observes v>0 (or v<0) reveals the purchased (resp., sold) quantity with probability & t 2 [0; 1] (resp., & t 2 [0; 1]), while with probability 1 & t (resp., 1 & t ) he only discloses information about trade direction. Speci…cally, for r(q; =q ) < (q; = ), type s=U pretends to be informed, disclosing how much he initially purchased or sold-as opposed to revealing only the direction of the trade-with probability & t and & t respectively. Notice also that there exist pre-defection pricing rules P & 2 in response to which no type of insider is indi¤erent between disclosing trade size and trade direction: For r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) (or (q; = )), when P & 2 ( =1; x 1 =0) equals and P & 2 ( =1; x 1 =x L ) is smaller than , in equilibrium all types of L (resp., of insider) only disclose trade direction; conversely, when
Finally notice that, because of the number of possible realizations of s and v observed by L in each …rst round, which is the same as in the previous sections, no sophistication of the notion of defection triggering the Grim punishment-that is, the second restriction (out of three) that characterizes the trigger strategy de…ned at the beginning of Section V.B-can in any way lead to a further increase of the information embedded into prices.
V.B.2. The case of an informed type immediately aware of v=v Let's consider a potential insider that, when informed, already learns v=v in the …rst round. Below we explain that, when drawing our attention to any of the alternative signaling channels studied so far, three regions over the space in 2 [0; 1) and q 2 (0; 1], characterized by high, intermediate, and low values of , can be identi…ed-call them upper, intermediate, and lower region respectively. For each pair and q lying over the upper (or intermediate; or lower) region, an equilibrium with fully (resp., partially; non-) informative disclosures exists, where the pricing rule and the leader's strategy coincide with those employed when (q; = ) (resp., r(q; =q ) < (q; = ); <r(q; =q )) by the same market maker and a leader that, when informed, only observes v ? 0 in round n=1.
To simplify the exposition, we focus on a regulation that mandates revelation of trade direction and prevents revelation of its size, and consider the trigger strategy in De…nition 2.
Indeed, for what concerns voluntary disclosure of the sole trade direction (or the disclosure of uncerti…ed/non-factual messages, or any of the four alternative regulations dealing with trade size disclosure listed in Section V.B.1), the reasoning is analogous. The motive for these similarities relates to the equivalence of the relevant payo¤ structures.
As for the case examined in Section II, which di¤ers from the one in question-namely, the mandatory disclosure of the sole trade direction-in the rate of arrival of private information, from period t=2 forward the leader only has expectations about the pro…ts from leading or misleading when s=I, and from blu¢ ng or not when s=U . Because of the symmetric space of actions, trigger strategy, and f ( v), the incentive to mislead (as opposed to leading) does not even depend on v being higher or lower than 0. Conversely, unlike the case studied in Section II, here in period t=1 the incentive to mislead depends on v=v. In detail, with respect to a situation where an insider only observes whether v ? 0 in round n=1, the multi-period problem of a leader that is currently informed is a¤ected as follows. For every inter-temporal strategy characterized by a current-period realization s=I^ v=v, a further control variable is introduced, to distinguish the insider's choice in period t=1 from his planned choice when informed in any future period. Consequently, the equation in Lemma 4 changes, so that re ‡ects the expectation of all informed types'period t=1 leading behavior.
As an intermediate step in the identi…cation of the three regions, we show that, in order to understand the role of the informed types in the determination of the informative equilibrium outcome, it is su¢ cient to draw attention to those aware of jvj j j rather than those that know v 2 ( ; ). To see why this is the case, de…ne, with X ( ; v), the extra-payo¤ that an insider earns in the current period from optimally misleading rather than leading. In particular, while X ( >0; jvj<j j)=j2x L vj depends on the speci…c value of v 2 ( ; ) that he observes, X ( >0; jvj j j)=2x L does not. Two remarks are in order. First, given the trigger strategy in De…nition 2, a characteristic that all the equilibria with informative disclosures share is that each insider aware of jvj j j>0 leads. This is due to the combined e¤ect of the following two elements. On the one hand, as we said, those that observe v (or v ) all have the same incentive to mislead today, which is why their equilibrium behavior is identical. 20 On the other, if the latter misled, a trigger strategy with >0 would not be justi…ed, in that in expectation the price shift would be too large. Second, every insider aware of jvj j j is more tempted to mislead today than any type aware of v 2 ( ; ), in that X ( >0; jvj<j j)<X ( >0; jvj j j). This means that, if and q are such that all types s=I^jvj j j lead-which as we have explained is always the case when the equilibrium is informative-every type s=I^v 2 ( ; ) leads too, the latter having a smaller incentive to mislead.
Clearly, for very high values of and any q 2 (0; 1], no manipulation arises and disclosures are fully informative, so that equals . In fact, since L weighs future pro…ts heavily, he prefers to lead when informed and not to blu¤ otherwise. 21 Now, starting from any pair ' 1 and q 2 (0; 1) and gradually shifting the parameter down, at some point a …rst switch in the equilibrium occurs, to one with uninformed manipulations that cause to equal q . Speci…cally, in line with Proposition 3, this …rst switch always takes place before a further decrease of causes the equilibrium to switch again, to one where no disclosure is informative. The driving force for this result is that, for any pair and q 2 (0; 1) and a positive , the overall incentive that type s=U has to blu¤(rather than not to blu¤) optimally today is greater than the overall incentive that a leader aware of v=v has from misleading (rather than leading) optimally today. To see it, let's consider those insiders aware of jvj j j, who have the highest incentive to mislead. Because [P( ) 0]=X ( >0; jvj j j), the per-period extra-payo¤ that type s=U achieves when blu¢ ng (rather than not blu¢ ng) equals the one that type s=I^jvj j j achieves from misleading (rather than leading). Nonetheless, the di¤erent inter-temporal consequences that these two choices imply are such that, for an insider that knows jvj j j-and thus for any type of insider-choosing to mislead today is overall less appealing than it is for type s=U to choose to blu¤ today. It follows that, over the space in 2 [0; 1) and q 2 (0; 1], immediately below the upper region, there is an intermediate region, where the weight granted by L to future pro…ts is not high enough to prevent him from manipulating today when uninformed, but is still too high for a misleading behavior to be a best reply. Two …nal remarks follow.
First, given any of the alternative signaling channels considered above, the model tells us that, by increasing the number of non-strategically equivalent states of the world-that is, by allowing a leader constrained on asset holdings either to observe v=v even in the …rst auction or to be uninformed with positive probability less than 1 (or both)-in equilibrium manipulative attempts occur only if (but not if ) the trader repeatedly acquires private information with probability q<1 and at the same time the state s=U is drawn.
Second, for a leader that, when informed, learns v=v from the beginning of the period, consider again public trade disclosure (a similar argument can be drawn for what pertains to uncerti…ed/non-factual announcements). In terms of equilibrium outcome, given the symmetric trigger strategy de…ned at the beginning of Section V.B, the level of information embedded in prices does not increase when a structural switch in the signaling channel is examined, from one where only three signals (i.e., = 1, =0, and =1) to one where in…nite alternative signals (i.e., the exact quantity traded) can be publicly observed. 22 However, when the latter channel is taken into account, provided the notion of defection triggering the Grim punishment is re…ned, for some pairs and q up to in…nite other informative equilibria can be identi…ed, where the level of information re ‡ected in prices is higher. Nonetheless, none of these equilibria is a perfect separating one, where each type signals di¤erently.
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VI. Further regulatory issues
In this section, we begin by studying the US short-swing rule. To assess its implications for market quality, attention is drawn to price-level e¢ ciency on one side, and manipulative behaviors on the other. In fact, regulators generally perceive an increase in the former as a possible target; however, consensus exists on the latter harming market integrity. In this respect, no synthetic index of market quality or price-level stability is generally accepted. Next, we explore the implications of a regulation mandating public pre-trade non-anonymity. 22 Even when the number of possible alternative signals is the highest, namely when considering a regulation which allows to voluntarily disclose trade size and mandates revelation of trade direction (or to voluntarily disclose either trade size or trade direction or nothing), whether or not a pre-defection pricing rule is such that
only impacts on whether, in equilibrium, L decides to disclose trade size too (resp., trade direction or trade size), as explained when characterizing the case in which the insider, at each …rst auction, only observes v? 0 (see Section V.B.1). 23 To sustain the perfect separating equilibrium, the trigger strategy should be such that, when a type of leader turns out to signal anything other than what only he is meant to send, a punishment follows. However, at this candidate equilibrium, no type has any incentive to avoid the punishment. The main reason for this relates to the fact that it impossible for any type, at each second round before defection, to bene…t from a reversal of the initial position, in that the market e¢ ciency condition requires the price following a speci…c signal to equal the type of leader who sent this signal. Not only is the per-period payo¤ following a perfect revelation of L's type never greater than what the same type achieves, in equilibrium, under A, but it is also smaller than what this type gets from defecting optimally, which is why this trigger strategy is not justi…ed.
VI.A. (Dis)advantages of the US short-swing rule
Very big stockholders, …rms' o¢ cers and principals on one side, and traders listed in Section 13 on the other, they are all forced by the SEC to disclose undertaken trades publicly. However, only o¢ cers and principals are subject to a further restriction, Section 16(b). We investigate whether this extra rule is strictly necessary or bene…cial.
When the short-swing rule is imposed, type s=U earns negative expected pro…ts from a reversal, which is always a dominated strategy. Nonetheless, the introduction of this restriction does not automatically guarantee that manipulations do not occur any more.
To see it, consider a two-round trading model, and a fundamental value v 2 f b; bg. When L can trade up to an identical, …nite quantity per round, under mandatory trade disclosure, a unique equilibrium exists where, with respect to the case in which the shortswing rule is not set (considered in Section III.A), the behavior of the informed types and the pricing rule coincide. An insider aware of b (or b) purchases (resp., sells) x L twice, and the price following the disclosure of a purchase (resp., sale) equals qb (resp., qb). At this equilibrium, for any q 6 = 1, an uninformed leader manipulates, initially randomizing with equal probability between a purchase and sale, but placing no further order in the second round. In fact, Section 16(b) does not discourage this type from trading in n=1, in which case he expects to earn 0 pro…ts. By doing so, with respect to a situation in which he is inactive, type s=U causes round n=2 prices to shift less, and therefore any informed type to earn more.
Under the assumption of an asset value v with two equally likely priors, let's now focus on a leader with constrained asset holdings, who is subject to the US short-swing rule. Among the di¤erent equilibria that arise, there exists a class of them in which a leader that observes v= b (or observes v=b, or is uninformed) trades x 1 = x L (resp., trades x 1 =x L ; places any probability, also equal to 0 or 1, on all round n=1 trade quantities, x 1 =0 included) and never trades afterwards, without being a¤ected, in terms of payo¤s, by the consequences that a disclosed sale or purchase have on prices. Di¤erently from the case in which Section 16(b) is not set and disclosures are believed not to be informative, by undertaking a round n=1 sale (or purchase), type s=U moves prices, a result which is clearly not quite credible. In fact, in contrast with a situation where L can trade only up to an identical, …nite quantity per round, here the imposition of the short-swing rule causes type s=U to be indi¤erent whether or not to place a …rst round order, as no other type bene…ts from this manipulative attempt. To account for this credibility matter, we invoke the following equilibrium re…nement.
De…nition 3 When a type of leader is indi¤erent whether or not to place orders at any round, this type opts for no order submission, unless this choice causes another type to earn less.
When this criterion is invoked, 'useless'manipulations by a leader with constrained asset holdings disappear, in that all the equilibria but those where type s=U is inactive are eliminated. In fact, it is easy to show that no equilibrium exists where this type earns a round n positive payo¤ (left to the reader). The equilibria surviving this re…nement are such that the price following the revelation of a sale or that of a purchase equals b and b respectively, and equals 0 otherwise. At these equilibria, with probability 2 [0; 1] a leader aware of v= b (or v=b) trades x 1 = x L (resp., x 1 =x L ) and, recalling that reversals are dominated, x 2 =0, while with probability 1 he trades x 1 =0, x 2 = x L (resp., x 2 =x L ). In particular, the equilibrium where equals 1 is the only one displaying robustness to a small probability that M exogenously learns v=v at the end of the …rst rather than of the second auction.
Finally, let's consider again a leader, with a cap on total exposure, who is subject to Section 16(b), generalizing the analysis to the case of a non-degenerate random variable v2V, and a period made of N rounds. In this case, an equilibrium exists where any price following the revelation of a …rst sale or of a …rst purchase equals E[ vj v<0] and E[ vj v>0] respectively, and equals 0 otherwise; while an uninformed leader never trades, one aware of v< E[ v] (or v> E[ v]) sells (resp., buys) x L in n=1, and does not trade afterwards. This equilibrium is robust to a small probability that the market exogenously learns v=v at the end of the …rst round.
To highlight advantages and disadvantages implied by the imposition of the US shortswing rule on a leader constrained on asset holdings, let's refer to this latter equilibrium. In case N =2, with respect to the equilibrium in Proposition 3, while for <r(q; =q ) the introduction of Section 16(b) makes disclosures informative, for r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) it also eliminates uninformed manipulations that would otherwise have occurred; conversely, for (q; = )
, this additional rule neither reduces manipulations-which would have not arisen in any case-nor improves price e¢ ciency. The negative e¤ect of Section 16(b) is that, following a …rst disclosure, which we explained to be fully informative, since this rule prevents reversals, in some instances it compromises any further revelation of information that the disclosure of an undertaken reversal (or its absence) would have conveyed otherwise. This happens when private information is su¢ ciently long-lived-that is, at each period, a sequence of at least three rounds takes place. In this case, when the short-swing rule is not added, equilibria arise, where a leader repeatedly acquiring new information over time never manipulates and price e¢ ciency is higher, providing is su¢ ciently high. Speci…cally, an equilibrium exists where, by trading in round n=1 and not trading in n=2 (because the cap on total exposure has been reached already), even absence of disclosure at the beginning of n=3 moves prices at that round (see Internet Appendix D for a characterization of this equilibrium). This outcome suggests some re ‡ections about the unconditional introduction of the short-swing rule, which in some instances is not successful.
The predictions presented in this subsection are robust, in two further respects. Under Section 16(b), the results are una¤ected if L, when informed, already learns v=v rather than v? E[ v] in n=1. Traded quantities and price responses (as a function of the state of the world) do not change in equilibrium, when the regulation mandates trade size disclosure.
VI.B. Public pre-trade non-anonymity
Public pre-trade disclosure characterizes markets in which, while placing orders, each investor is mandated to reveal his identity, together with information concerning (at least) the direction of the submitted quantity.
First we analyze the case of a mandatory disclosure of order direction, when no order size can be disclosed (under mandatory order size disclosure, or when order direction is mandatory and order size is voluntary, the derivation of the equilibrium is similar, and left to the reader). Then we re…ne beliefs according to De…nition 3. When this criterion is invoked, as long as at least the direction of orders is compulsorily revealed to the public, prices do not shift because the potential insider prefers to stay out of the market.
A distinguishing feature of all the following results is that their derivation does not depend on the maximum quantity that L can trade per round. In the analysis, we refer to an investor that, with probability q, observes v=v from the very …rst of a …nite number of auction. Even though, for simplicity, this trader is assumed to be small, in the end we will explain why this assumption can be relaxed without a¤ecting the equilibrium outcome, which does not depend on how informative the order- ‡ow is.
A solution is provided for any non-degenerate random variable v2V, whose support lowerand upper-bound are denoted with b 2 < and b 2 < respectively. We will show that, unless b = b = 1, alternative trading strategies can be part of an equilibrium. Moreover, when the probability that v equals b (or b) is positive-which is the case for discrete and (several) mixed distributions-alternative pricing rules can be justi…ed. Nonetheless, we will see that, by invoking the re…nement in De…nition 3, the equilibrium surviving the criterion will be unique.
Consider a regulation such that, as soon as an order is submitted-that is, before the price is set-the leader has to disclose whether he is undertaking a purchase or a sale. In detail, at the very beginning of round n 2 f1; ::; N g, the signal x n 2 f 1; 0; 1g is released, where x n =1 (or x n = 1; or x n =0) implies that L is submitting a buy (resp., a sell; no) order in n.
24 In this context, it follows that the pricing rule, P =h P 1 ; ::; P n i, is such that the function P n : f 1; 0; 1g n ! [b; b] depends on all the orders placed by L until that auction n (included). To derive the equilibrium, a key step consists of focusing on the last auction, N . First notice that, by not trading, L earns 0 pro…ts, no matter where P N (x 1 ; ::; x N =0) lies. Second, suppose that L is signaling x N = 1 (the argument is symmetric when the leader signals x N =1). Because any type of leader aware (at least in expectation, if s=U ) of v=v>P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1) prefers not to trade rather than to sell in N , only a type aware (at least in expectation) of v=v P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1) can be the one that sends this signal. In particular, if this latter type earns a positive round N payo¤, then the pricing rule is wrong. This is because P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1) turns out to be strictly greater than the expected asset value conditional on the information available, unless every type aware (at least in expectation) of v=v<P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1) earns even more from purchasing in N , in which case-for an analogous argument-the price P N (x 1 ; ::; x N =1) turns out to be strictly smaller than what it should be. It follows that a pricing rule is justi…ed if it is such that every type of leader aware (at least in expectation) that v is di¤erent from P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1) and P N (x 1 ; ::; x N =1) strictly prefers to signal x N =0. Speci…cally: (i) As long as a 'perfect revelation' of the investor's type at any previous auction has not yet occurred, P N (x 1 ; ::; x N = 1)=b (or P N (x 1 ; ::; x N =1)=b) is the sole price response that causes every type of leader but that aware of v=b (resp., v=b) not to sell (resp., not to purchase) in N . Given this price response, an investor that observes v=b (resp., v=b) weakly prefers to disclose x N = 1 (resp., x N =1), earning as much as he achieves when he does not trade in N (an action that is always feasible), namely 0. (ii) If L's type has already been perfectly identi…ed in a speci…c auction n<N , the leader earns a round N payo¤ equal to 0. In fact, no matter whether he submits a buy, a sell, or no order in N -an action that depends on the position limit to which L is subject, if any-the price p N will not shift from the correct price already set in n.
In conclusion, although L's action in round N depends on past events-namely, on his action and M's pricing rule at any previous auction-in equilibrium the payo¤ that L achieves from selecting one round N best response or another is independent of past history, in that he always earns a round N payo¤ equal to 0. Thus, while deriving L's inter-round equilibrium actions, round N can be treated separately from the …rst N 1 auction, because L's inter-temporal choice up to round N (excluded) is not a¤ected by his decision in this latter round. Now, consider only the …rst N 1 auctions. Focusing on the new 'last round'-that is, round N 1-the same conclusions reached when analyzing round N can be drawn. Following this logical process, we note that L's inter-termporal choice at each round is not a¤ected by his decision in any future round. The payo¤ he achieves from selecting a best round n response or another equals 0, no matter what equilibrium action L and M play at any other past or future auction.
In equilibrium, (i) until the round in which a perfect revelation of the type occurs (included), a potential insider aware (at least in expectation, if s=U ) of b<v<b does not submit orders at any round. Indeed, for supports of v bounded on the left (or right), a leader that observes v=b (resp., v=b) randomizes with any probability-even 0 or 1, and not necessarily equal within rounds-between selling (resp., purchasing) any quantity and not trading. Conversely, (ii) from the round following a perfect revelation of the trader onwards, any type of leader places any probability on each feasible action, given his position limit.
For what concerns equilibrium prices, before a …rst order is placed, they equal E[ v] at any round, unless either v=b or v=b has positive mass, in which cases, depending on beliefs, an initial lack of submissions may shift prices and, in some instances, lead to a perfect revelation of the type (see Internet Appendix E). In case an initial series of missed submissions does not perfectly reveal L's type, a perfect revelation occurs as soon as L submits a …rst order, which shifts prices to b or b depending on whether this submission is a sell or a buy order respectively.
Whether the cap on total exposure (or the quantity that the potential insider is allowed to submit per round), x L , is negligible or not, and in the latter case, whether x L is …nite or equal to 1, does not play a role in the determination of these equilibria. In other words, the associated outcomes do not depend on the leader being a small or a large investor. In fact, focusing on the derivation of the results above, it is clear that, even when only the order direction has to be mandatorily disclosed, the price at round n does not depend on the past and present order- ‡ow, fx 1 + u 1 ; ::; x n + u n g, because fx 1 ; ::; x n g turns out to be a su¢ cient statistic for fx 1 ; ::; x n ; x 1 + u 1 ; ::; x n + u n g with respect to v. Thus, not only the support of u n can be bounded. Any speci…cation about the properties of the noise traders'demand is acceptable.
When the criterion in De…nition 3 is invoked, asset value properties no longer play a role. A unique equilibrium survives this re…nement. At this equilibrium, L never submits orders and P n (x i =0; 8i 2 f0; ::; ng)=E [ v] . In fact, denoting with 2 f1; ::; N g the …rst round in which L places an order, the equilibrium price responses P n2f ;::;N g (x i =0; x = 1; 8i< )=b and P n2f ;::;N g (x i =0; x =1; 8i< )=b represent an implicit threat that makes any type of leader at least weakly prefer inactivity to any other strategy. By deciding not to trade at any auction, neither type b nor type b causes any other type to experience a payo¤ reduction. Therefore, given our restriction on beliefs, every type of leader now prefers not to trade at all.
To sum up, re…ning beliefs in the way we suggested, a clear result is derived. A regulation mandating at least pre-trade disclosure of order directions keeps the potential insider away from the market. This result is independent of (i) the asset value statistical properties, (ii) the size of L, (iii) the position limit to which L is subject, and (iv) the noise traders'demand.
VII. Conclusion
The present article studies public disclosure of inside statements by 'small'investors, who exchange without being spotted, and develops a comprehensive theory of market non-anonymity that brings several novel results of concern to investors and regulators.
First, we examine the e¤ects of a regulation mandating investors to publicly certify trades undertaken. The analysis reduces regulators'concerns about this form of disclosure. In fact, only in speci…c instances will a trader with constrained asset holdings manipulate when uninformed. Asset value properties, market beliefs, inter-temporal choices, and investors'characteristics play a role. The divergence with which di¤erent regulations list the investors and the conditions (on allowed delay and on minimal exchanged quantity) to report trades con…rms how a consensus on who best should disclose has not yet been reached. On this front, the solution to the problem of a trader who is in the position repeatedly to acquire new inside information indicates that, if prices react to current disclosures, those traders who are less likely to be informed (e.g., investors not directly involved in the …rm's management) tend to undertake uninformed manipulations; conversely, those who are more likely to be informed (e.g., CEOs) tend not to manipulate when unaware about elements that will a¤ect the fundamental value. Actually, the SEC obliges also principal stockholders to disclose their trades. In this respect, our study highlights that, by allowing for a su¢ cient delay in reporting trades, even these big investors-instead of dissimulating, when informed, to reduce the leakage of inside information-will behave similarly to small-sized traders, breaking down each pre-decided order into several small chunks.
The second but most important result of this article is that mandating trade revelation is unnecessary. In fact, under mandatory disclosure, our trader turns out to achieve a higher payo¤ compared to the case of no public disclosure. Therefore, by changing the regulation and making trade reporting not compulsory, any time the price is known to react to current disclosures, the investor turns out to have all the incentives to trade as before, voluntarily revealing to the public any transaction undertaken immediately after having exchanged up to his (privately known) maximum. Not only does this result indicate that there is no need to enforce trade reporting with punitive laws or invigilation, nor to study which delay to allow in publicizing trades. It also reveals a link to the strain of literature on (uncerti…ed or non-factual) announcements in capital markets, upon which we improve by getting over the assumption of a truthful or honest insider. 25 Rather, truthfulness or honesty are entirely derived at the equilibrium. As for the revelation of certi…ed trades, we show that informative disclosures occur voluntarily, except when the fundamental value is constrained to two possible realizations, in which case meaningful voluntary disclosures cannot be modeled. In particular, when the market interprets a non-factual message as favorable/unfavorable, even in this case prices react as they do following the disclosure of a certi…ed purchase/sale, namely the kind of transaction that the investor actually undertakes in secret before disclosing that non-factual message. Hence, in those instances where investors manipulate, requiring them to certify their trades does not prevent the price from moving accidentally in the opposite direction with respect to the real asset value. In fact, "actions do not speak louder than words". Still, because of its fast operating time, certifying trades electronically may guarantee a higher chance that the signal reaches the public before inside information reaches its end time. Consequently, electronically certi…ed trades may allow for higher levels of price e¢ ciency over time, together with a higher incident of possible price overshooting, which ultimately represents the goal for whose achievement the insider discloses voluntarily.
Finally, the imposition of two alternative rules is modeled. The US short-swing rule ensures that any otherwise appealing deceptive aim is not pursued. However, its unconditional adoption has drawbacks. Public pre-trade non-anonymity keeps insiders away from the market, yet this measure implies the lowest price e¢ ciency level.
To conclude, the smallness assumption in terms of price impact makes our model fairly tractable, and allows to generalize the analysis in di¤erent dimensions (e.g., that of the fundamental value distribution), with predictions that are robust in many respects. In particular, the results pertaining to the revelation of certi…ed transactions hold for several combinations of provision for order direction and order size disclosure. By questioning which combination of factors drives each of our results, this article also helps us to understand better the determinants for a 25 With the exception of the uncerti…ed revelation of trades-whose truthfulness is often enforced (at least on paper) by vigilance, preventing any lying about relevant facts-for what concerns the production of non-factual messages, truthfulness (even when the message makes some reference to inside information) and honesty are generally hard to verify and interpret respectively, and thus not enforceable (see also BL, p. 947). Hence a priori it is di¢ cult to reconcile this moral conduct with that of pro…t-maximizing traders.
number of important predictions in literature, from which ours di¤er. Because of its simplicity, the present analytical framework represents an ideal benchmark to which future research can refer to measure and re…ne our knowledge or challenge the policy implications derived herein.
Appendix
Derivation of S in Lemma 3. For an in…nite horizon, with M's strategy held …xed, by defecting at period t=1, L's expected pro…ts from t=2 on (discounted to t=1) equal 1 qx L ; by not defecting in t=1, they equal S, where S also depends on q, , . To underline it, we write S(q; ; ;
, where:
which can be written as:
]. This is a …rst order linear di¤erence equation. Thus:
The series converges if j 'j<1, which is always veri…ed, because 0 <1 and 0 ' 1. In fact: For any possible pricing rule such that p 1 =0 and that 9 : P 2 ( ) 6 = 0, we prove the following. (I) Assuming an insider that observes v=v even in n=1, derive each type of insider's optimal strategy, X( s=I^ v=v). Holding X …xed and inverting it to make the information possessed by L explicit, we show that, when M is replying to at least half of the types of insider-those belonging either to [ b; 0) or (0; b]-contradictions arise, in that he sets either P 2 ( = ; X)=E[ v j v=v<0]>0 in response to the disclosure by each leader aware of v=v<0, or P 2 ( = ; X)=E[ v j v=v>0]<0 in response to the disclosure by each leader aware of v=v>0. (II) When in n=1 the insider only observes whether v<0 or v>0, the price that M sets in round n=2 in response to at least one of the two types of insider turns out to lie over (0; b] (or [ b; 0)) when L observes v<0 (resp., v>0).
(I) Eight cases (from C1 to C8) representing all the possible combinations of M's strategy pro…les can be identi…ed. C1:
Given this strategy pro…le, the following sub-cases can be identi…ed. (i) When P 2 ( )=0, 8 , no contradiction of the sort described above arises. (ii) When at least one, but not every, signal =i causes P 2 ( =i) to equal 0, the best response by an insider aware of v=v<0, X( s=I^ v=v<0), is such that 6 = i. To see it, it is su¢ cient to notice that, in case P 2 ( =1) (or P 2 ( =0); or P 2 ( = 1)): (ii.a) equals 0, an insider aware of v=v<0 that decides to signal =1 (resp., =0; = 1) cannot do any better than trading in such a way that
26 Holding X …xed, we have that P 2 ( 6 = i; X)= E[ v j v=v<0]>0, which is a contradiction. Finally, (iii) when P 2 ( )>0, 8 , any response X by each type s=I^ v=v<0 is such that P 2 ( = ; X)=E[ v j v=v<0]>0. C2:
This case is symmetric to C1. C3:
Given this pricing rule, the strategy X=hx 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L i strictly dominates any other, provided the insider observes v=v> max f0; ; g, where =P 2 ( = 1)+P 2 ( =1) and =P 2 ( = 1)+
. 27 It follows that, as long as max f ; g 0, each type aware of v=v>0 prefers X. Holding X 1 ( s=I^f ; g 0<v) = x L …xed, we have that 0>P 2 ( = 1; X)=E[ v j v=v>0], 8v>0, which is a contradiction. Now we show that, when M is replying to any type of insider aware of v=v<0 with the pricing rule in C3, contradictions arise, provided max f ; g>0. Before we proceed, the following intermediate results need to be established. From an insider perspective: (i) When v=v<0, the strategy hx 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i (or hx 1 =0; x 2 = x L i) strictly dominates any other strategy such that x 1 >0 (resp., x 1 =0).
(ii) When v P 2 ( = 1)<0, both hx 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i and hx 1 =0; x 2 = x L i also strictly dominate any strategy such that
x 2 =2x L i (which dominates any alternative strategy such that
), the pro…ts that an insider earns from playing hx 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i are greater than (resp., equal to; smaller than) those from playing hx 1 =0; x 2 = x L i. As a consequence of the results at point i, ii, iii, and iv, when max f ; g>0, the following conclusions can be drawn. (a) Suppose that P 2 ( =1)>
. (a.i) If >0, no matter which value assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v<0 strictly prefers X=hx 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i to any other strategy. Holding X …xed, it follows that 0<P 2 ( =1; X)=E[ v j v=v<0], 8v<0, which is a contradiction. (a.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0< , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on and explicit, it follows that it refer to a situation where
, which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point a-the one of P 2 ( =1)>
(case in which P 2 ( =0)>0 for sure). This condition on prices implies that = . Thus, the only relevant sub-case to be studied is the one of = >0. In this instance, each insider aware of v=v<0 replies by randomizing between hx 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i and hx 1 =0; x 2 = x L i. Holding the trading strategy by each of these types of insider …xed, regardless of the probability with which he initially buys or does not trade (even 0 or 1), the price in response to his disclosure turns out to lie above 0, which is a contradiction. (c) Suppose that P 2 ( =1)<
(case in which P 2 ( =0)>0 for sure). (c.i) If >0, no matter which value assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v<0 strictly prefers X=hx 1 =0; x 2 = x L i to any other strategy. Holding X …xed, it follows that 0<P 2 ( =0; X)=E[ v j v=v<0], 8v<0, which is a contradiction. (c.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0< , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on and explicit, it follows that P 2 ( = 1)+
, which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point c-the one of P 2 ( =1)<
This case is symmetric to C3. C5:
, it can be shown that buying a negligible quantity in n=1 and buying again up to the maximum capacity in n=2, that is hx 1 & 0; x 2 . x L i, dominates any other strategy. However, holding X 1 ( v=v>0)=x 1 & 0 …xed, it follows that 0>P 2 ( =1; X)=E[ v j v=v>0], a contradiction. C6:
This case is symmetric to C5. C7:
The following sub-cases can be identi…ed. (i) For P 2 ( 6 = 0)=0, we end up in case C1. (ii) For P 2 ( 6 = 0) 6 = 0, each insider aware of v>0, for example, strictly prefers hx 1 =x L ; x 2 =0i to hx 1 =0; x 2 = i, which means that he signals in a way that pushes p 2 below 0.
to any other strategy. The price response to the behavior by each of these types in such that
This case is symmetric to C7. (II) Notice that, in response to a pricing rule, if all types of leader already aware, in round n=1, of v=v>0 (or v=v<0) prefer to submit a speci…c order x 1 2 [ b; b]-alternatively, if they are indi¤erent about placing a speci…c round n=1 order or another-then a leader that in n=1 only observes v>0 (resp., v<0) displays an identical preference over actions. Because in part I we showed that, in response to a pricing rule such that p 2 =0 and that 9 : P 2 ( ) 6 = 0, each type of insider aware of either v=v<0 or v=v>0 places an identical …rst round order, x 1 , which causes contradictions to arise, it follows that, when in round n=1 the insider is only aware of whether v<0 or v>0, the best reply X by either type s=I^ v<0 or type s=I^ v>0 is such that P 2 ( = ; X)=E[ v j v<0]>0 or P 2 ( = ; X)= E[ v j v>0]<0 respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the case of >0. To model L's behavior, let's introduce an auxiliary random variable, , which (without loss of generality) has the following propriety:
For a leader that decides to mislead rather than lead with probability _ : (i) If _ , then: (i.a) When 0< v=v< (or 0> v=v> ), case that happens with probability 2 [F ( ) F (0)], buying (resp., selling) a quantity x L in n=1 and reversing this position in n=2 by selling (resp., buying) x L and continuing selling (resp., buying) an extra quantity x L is the optimal strategy if L decides to trade in two rounds. Besides, trading in two rounds dominates trading only in one. (i.b) When v=v (or v=v ), case that happens with probability 2 [F (b) F ( )], buying (resp., selling) up to x L in n=1 or in n=2 and then waiting up to public revelation of v=v dominates buying (resp., selling) a positive quantity in both rounds. In n=1, L still does not know v=v; thus buying (resp., selling) up to x L in n=1 dominates doing it in n=2 because, if L traded only in n=2, with probability Pr(0<v< ) he would miss the opportunity to pro…t by subsequently reversing his position, in the manner explained above. (ii) If < _ , L's optimal strategy is to trade x 1 = x L (or x 1 =x L ) when v>0 (resp., v<0) and reverse his position up to the limit capacity in n=2.
Proof of Proposition 2. First we …nd _ I that maximizes L's discounted expected pro…ts over periods. In details, , buying (resp., selling) a quantity x L in n=1 and selling (resp., buying) a quantity 2x L in n=2 is the optimal strategy, which makes L earn under expectation
Proof of Proposition 3. For >0, we prove only that (a) if > (q; ), then
To …nd the maximum of E I and E U , consider
All the denominators (function of 
]. First, focusing on cases (i.a) and (i.c), we have that (q; )>r(q; ) ) 2P( )> M( ) L( ), which can be shown to be always veri…ed. Thus, the su¢ cient condition for the pair _ =0; _ =0 to guarantee the highest expected pro…ts is > (q; ). For = (q; ), we have that
]. In particular, notice that
2 <0 and that lim q!0 (q; >0)! 1. Second, focusing on cases (i.b) and (i.c), we have that r(q; )< 
]. For > (q; ), it is easy to see that the pair _ =0; _ =0 implies expected pro…ts that are strictly greater than those associated to any other pair, while for = (q; ) we have that E[
]. Proceeding as we did so far, it can be shown that, for =r(q; ) (or <r(q; )), there is at least a pair _ =1, _ = that generates an inter-temporal payo¤ equal to (resp., greater than)
Proof of Corollary 2. Here we consider only the single period. For any possible pricing rule such that p 1 =0 and that 9 : P 2 ( ) 6 = 0, we prove the following. Assuming an insider that observes v=v even in n=1, derive each type of insider's best reply, consisting of a triple x 1 ; ; x 2 . Holding this strategy …xed, we show that M is setting either p 2 >0 in response to the signal sent by each type s=I^ v=v<0, or p 2 <0 in response to the signal sent by each type s=I^ v=v>0. To demonstrate the result, eight cases (from C1 to C8) representing all the possible combinations of M's strategy pro…les are identi…ed. C1:
The analysis of this case is in line with that conduced under mandatory trade disclosure (see proof to Proposition 1, case C1). C2:
This case is symmetric to that above.
C3:
Given this pricing rule, from an insider perspective, disclosing = 1 while trading x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L strictly dominates any other strategy, provided he observes v=v>max f0; ; 0 g, where 0 =P 2 ( = 1)+P 2 ( =0). 28 It follows that, as long as max f ; 0 g 0, each type of insider aware of v=v>0 prefers to trade x 1 = x L and disclose the undertaken sale. Holding this strategy …xed, it turns out that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price below 0, which is a contradiction. Now we show that, when M is replying to any type of insider aware of v=v<0 with the pricing rule in C3, contradictions arise, provided max f ; 0 g>0. Before we proceed, the following intermediate results need to be established. From the perspective of an insider aware of v=v<0: (i) When he signals =1 (or =0), the pro…ts from trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L are greater than those from trading any other combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp., x 1 ; x 2 ). (ii) When v P 2 ( = 1)<0, the pro…ts from signaling =1 (or =0) while trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L are greater than those from signaling = 1 while trading any quantity x 1 <0; x 2 . (iii) When P 2 ( = 1)<v<0, the pro…ts from signaling =1 (or =0) while trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L are greater than those from signaling = 1 while trading any quantity
, that is only if v< (resp., v< 0 ). (iv) When he trades x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L , the pro…ts from signaling =1 rather than =0 are greater (or equal; or smaller), provided P 2 ( =1)>P 2 ( =0) (resp., P 2 ( =1)=P 2 ( =0); P 2 ( =1)<P 2 ( =0)). As a consequence of the results at point i, ii, iii, and iv, when max f ; 0 g>0, the following conclusions can be drawn. (a) Suppose that P 2 ( =1)>P 2 ( =0). (a.i) If >0, no matter which value 0 assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v<0 strictly prefers to trade x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L and signal =1 rather than to play any other strategy. Holding this strategy …xed, we have that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price above 0, which is a contradiction. (a.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0< 0 , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on and 0 explicit, it follows that P 2 ( = 1)+P 2 ( =1) 0<P 2 ( = 1)+ P 2 ( =0) ) P 2 ( =1)<P 2 ( =0), which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point a-the one of P 2 ( =1)>P 2 ( =0). (b) Suppose that P 2 ( =1)=P 2 ( =0) (case in which P 2 ( =0)>0 for sure). This condition on prices implies that = 0 . Thus, the only relevant sub-case is the one of = 0 >0. In this instance, each insider aware of v=v<0 replies by randomizing between signaling =1 and =0 while trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L . Holding the strategy by each of these types of insider …xed, regardless of the probability with which he discloses =1 or =0 (even 0 or 1), the price in response to his disclosure turns out to lie above 0, which is a contradiction. (c) Suppose that P 2 ( =1)<P 2 ( =0) (case in which P 2 ( =0)>0 for sure). (c.i) If 0 >0, no matter which value assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v<0 strictly prefers to trade x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L and signal =0 rather than to play any other strategy. Holding this strategy …xed, it follows that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price above 0, which is a contradiction. (c.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0 0< , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on 0 and explicit, it follows that
, which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point c-the one of P 2 ( =1)<P 2 ( =0).
28 To see it, consider an insider that observes v=v>0. First notice that, if he signals = 1, the pro…ts from trading any alternative combination of quantities such that x 1 <0 are smaller. Second, for v P 2 ( =1) (or v P 2 ( =0)), the pro…ts from signaling =1 (resp., =0) while trading any combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp., x 1 ; x 2 ) are smaller. Third, for 0<v<P 2 ( =1) (or 0<v<P 2 ( =0)), it is easy to derive that the pro…ts from signaling =1 (resp., =0) while trading any combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp.,
, that is only if v> (resp., v> 0 ).
C4:
This case is symmetric to that above. C5:
Given this strategy pro…le and an insider informed about v=v<0, notice that the pro…ts from signaling = 1 (or =0) while trading x 1 . 0; x 2 . x L (resp., x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L ) are greater than those from signaling =1 while trading x 1 >0; x 2 . In addition, if he signals = 1 (or =0), the pro…ts that from trading x 1 . 0; x 2 . x L (resp., x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L ) are greater than those from trading any alternative combination of quantities x 1 <0; x 2 (resp., x 1 ; x 2 ), unless P 2 ( = 1)=0 (resp., P 2 ( =0)=0), case in which he is indi¤erent between this strategy and any other such that x 1 +x 2 = x L^x1 <0 (resp., x 1 +x 2 = x L ). Thus, when deriving the best response by an insider aware of v=v<0, it is su¢ cient to check whether he prefers to signal = 1 or =0 while trading
>P 2 ( =0) (or
<P 2 ( =0)), case in which P 2 ( = 1)>0 (resp., P 2 ( =0)>0) for sure, then each type s=I^ v=v<0 prefers the former (resp., the latter). Holding this strategy …xed, it turns out that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price which lies above 0, which is a contradiction. (b) If
=P 2 ( =0)>0, each of these types is indi¤erent towards the two options. Holding his best response …xed, regardless of the probability with which he discloses = 1 or =0 (even 0 or 1), the price in response to his disclosure turns out to lie above 0, which is a contradiction. (c) If
=P 2 ( =0)=0, we end up in case C2. C6:
This case is symmetric to that above. C7:
Given this strategy pro…le, from an insider perspective, signaling =0 while trading x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L strictly dominates any other strategy, provided he observes v=v<min f0; 0 ; 0 g, where
. 29 It follows that, as long as min f 0 ; 0 g 0, each type of insider aware of v=v<0 prefers to trade x 1 =x L and signal =0. Holding this strategy …xed, it turns out that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price above 0, which is a contradiction. Now we show that, when M is replying to any type of insider aware of v=v>0 with the pricing rule in C7, contradictions arise, provided min f 0 ; 0 g<0. Before we proceed, the following intermediate results need to be established. From the perspective of an insider aware of v=v>0: (i) When he signals =1 (or = 1), the pro…ts from trading x 1 & 0; x 2 . x L (resp., x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L ) are greater than those from trading any alternative combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp., x 1 <0; x 2 ). (ii) When v P 2 ( =0)>0, the pro…ts from signaling =1 (or = 1) while trading
are greater than those from signaling =0 while trading any quantity x 1 ; x 2 . (iii) When 0<v<P 2 ( =0), the pro…ts from signaling =1 (or = 1) while trading
x 2 =2x L ) are greater than those from signaling =0 while trading any quantity
; or P 2 ( = 1)<
), the pro…ts from signaling =1 while trading x 1 & 0; x 2 . x L are greater than (resp., equal to; smaller than) those from signaling = 1 29 To see it, consider an insider that observes v=v<0. First notice that, if he signals = 1, the pro…ts from trading any alternative combination of quantities such that x 1 <0 are smaller. Second, for v P 2 ( =1) (or v P 2 ( = 1)), the pro…ts from signaling =1 (resp., = 1) while trading any combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp., x 1 <0; x 2 ) are smaller. Third, for P 2 ( =1)<v<0 (or P 2 ( = 1)<v<0), it is easy to derive that the pro…ts from signaling =1 (resp., = 1) while trading any combination of quantities x 1 >0; x 2 (resp.,
As a consequence of the results at point i, ii, iii, and iv, when min f 0 ; 0 g<0, the following conclusions can be drawn. (a) Suppose that P 2 ( = 1)>
(case in which P 2 ( =1)<0 for sure). (a.i) If 0 <0, no matter which value 0 assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v>0 strictly prefers to trade x 1 & 0; x 2 . x L and signal =1 rather than to play any other strategy. Holding this strategy …xed, we have that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price that lies below 0, which is a contradiction. (a.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0 <0 0 , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on 0 and 0 explicit, it follows that P 2 ( = 1)+P 2 ( =0)<0 P 2 ( =0)+
, which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point a-the one of P 2 ( = 1)>
=0, we end up in case C1. (c) Suppose that P 2 ( = 1)=
<0. This condition on prices implies that 0 = 0 . Thus, the only relevant sub-case is the one of 0 = 0 <0. In this instance, each insider aware of v=v>0 replies by randomizing between signaling =1 and = 1 while trading
Holding the strategy by each of these types of insider …xed, regardless of the probability with which he discloses =1 or =0 (even 0 or 1), the price in response to his disclosure turns out to lie below 0, which is a contradiction. (d) Suppose that P 2 ( = 1)<
(case in which P 2 ( = 1)<0 for sure).
, no matter which value 0 assumes, then each type s=I^ v=v>0 strictly prefers to trade x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L and signal = 1 rather than to play any other strategy. Holding this strategy …xed, it follows that, in response to each of these types, M is setting a price that lies below 0, which is a contradiction. (d.ii) The remaining sub-case, namely the one of 0 <0 0 , is not of interest. In fact, making the condition on 0 and 0 explicit, we have that
, which is not a possibility, being the case in question-i.e., point c-the one of P 2 ( = 1)< P 2 ( =1) 2 . C8: P 2 ( =0)<0^P 2 ( =1) 0^P 2 ( = 1) 0. This case is symmetric to that above.
Proof of Corollary 4. The analysis of the single period is in line with that in Corollary 2, and left to the reader. When considering the in…nitely repeated structure, what follows needs to be proven.
When informed about v>0, an insider that does not want to defect prefers to push the market price toward the right direction, signaling i;1 rather than i;0 (the case of L aware of v<0 is similar). Speci…cally, when signaling i;1 , the best thing he can do is to buy x 1 =x L and then trade optimally, earning under expectation L( ). In fact, trading h x 1 ' 0; x 2 = i or h x 1 = x L ; x 2 = i are dominated. Signaling i;0 and trading h x 1 = ; x 2 = i leads to a payo¤ which is smaller than L( ).
When informed about v>0, an insider that wants to defect signals i; 1 . In this case, he maximizes his pro…ts by trading
When the leader is uninformed, if he signals i;0 , he avoids the punishment with certainty. In this case, no matter what the quantity traded in each of the two rounds is, he expects to earn 0 pro…ts. Conversely, if he signals i;1 (or i; 1 ), he incurs the punishment with probability . In this case, trading h x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L i (resp., h x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L i) implies the highest expected pro…ts, which equal P( ).
Internet Appendix B
On post-trade mandatory disclosure: Reconsidering van Bommel (2003) . This appendix reconsiders van Bommel (2003), hereafter VB, which studies a Kyle's model with a risky asset exchanged among a leader with a negligible cup on total exposure, noise traders, M, and competitive followers. L sends rumors to followers, who reveal them to M through a change in asset demand. Two separate stage games (ending with the exogenous revelation of v) are presented. In the …rst, the existence of L, commonly known to be of type "Honest", is assumed. He has to say "buy" if he observes v=v 0 (or "sell" if v=v<0); when uninformed, L cannot spread any rumor. In the second model, L is known to be of type "Blu¤er", so when informed he has to play like an Honest, and when uninformed he has to say randomly either "buy" or "sell".
Assuming v U [ 2; 2]; u N(0;I); cov( u; v)=0, VB de…nes the equilibrium price at round n 2 f1; ::; N g, p n . As n ! 1, it is argued that p n asymptotically converges to a certain value.
Very recently, van Bommel (2008) tries to justify why in VB the leader does not trade in n 2 f2; ::; N 1g. The clari…cation does not consider any of the following matters, which seriously weaken the validity of the conjectures in VB; its content does not help in this sense.
The equilibrium price dynamic derived from assuming an Honest, and especially the one assuming a Blu¤er, are not appropriate, mainly because v and the aggregate demand at auction n are treated as independent random variables, even though they are indirectly dependent ( v a¤ects L's rumor; this impacts on followers'demand, a¤ecting the mean of the aggregate demand). Even considering the recent clari…cation by the author, the pricing rule is not justi…ed.
A simpler approach saves the conclusion in VB. Rather than a stage game t made of in…nite auctions, assume two auctions, and consider L spreading rumors directly to M. The (corrected) contribution is the following. When type Honest is imposed, if L says "buy" (or "sell"; or ".."), then p 2 =1 (resp., p 2 = 1; p 2 =0). With a Blu¤er, if L says "buy" (or "sell"), then p 2 =q (resp., p 2 = q). The equilibria hold for a more general class of distributions than u N(0;I). Followers do not play a role, so there is no need to assume about them any more.
To relax this peculiar notion of type assumption, VB allows an informed L to choose between two alternatives in n=1: the equilibrium trading and (imposed) signaling strategy, or "cheat" (i.e., spread a so called "false" rumor and trade in the opposite direction). It is argued that the rumor is not informative any more because, holding …xed M's best response to an insider forced to play according to his type, the insider cheats, reversing his position afterwards. However this only proves that, for this very speci…c pricing rule, a deviation by the insider occurs.
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Within an in…nitely repeated framework, the su¢ cient condition for the sustainability of the so-called "Honest equilibrium" proposed in VB consists of an inter-period discount factor such that, when L is uninformed in t=1, the pro…ts from being Honest forever are greater than those from being Blu¤er in t=1, and Honest from t=2 on (this in case L does not incur the punishment in t=1). However, among other points, it is unclear why the sender should consider the opportunity of randomizing when uninformed at a certain date, but not when facing an identical situation in the future. Our methodology and results di¤er drastically. Speci…cally, for each pair 2 (0; 1) and q 2 (0; 1), two extra levels of randomization-which become three, in Section V, when an informed leader learns v=v from the beginning of the period-are required, to assess the existence of informative equilibria.
While an ad hoc trigger strategy for the sustainability of the Honest equilibrium is imposed in VB, we consider a general Grim, showing that: (i) Another group of equilibria exists, similar to that presented by VB in the stage game with an imposed Blu¤er type; (ii) for a general f ( v), irrespective of the value of q 2 (0; 1), a level of exists, at which manipulations are always possible. Internet Appendix C studies other informative equilibria and manipulative behaviors. 30 Consider for simplicity mandatory disclosure. There exist pricing rules such that: (i) L prefers not to disclose trades (this strategy is somehow equivalent to the no-rumor disclosure in VB). For instance, consider L observing v=v ' 0 ' P ( =1) ' P ( = 1) and P ( =0) su¢ ciently far from v; (ii) no subsequent reversal of the initial position occurs.
Contrary to what is stated in VB (p.1502), not all f ( v) can be used. It is untrue that this kind of "analysis uses a special case of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) signaling game" (VB, p.1500): Cheap-talk games do not require private information to be exogenously revealed at any time.
Internet Appendix C Price-shift uniqueness. This appendix lists minimal restrictions on beliefs that guarantee price-shift uniqueness. To start with, it is worth noticing that, any time signals are believed not to be informative in a speci…c period, L cannot do any better than trading as he does when that period is not repeated, a behavior that con…rms M's initial beliefs. As a consequence, for each pair and q and a speci…c equilibrium pricing rule such that at period t=1 prices react to disclosures, in…nite other equilibria exist, where prices start shifting according to the same rule from period t>1, as if history started from period t, while in the preceding t 1 periods prices do not react to news. Although no limit can be set to the initial number of periods in which disclosures are believed not to be informative, in the following analysis there is no loss in generality in assuming that, if prices shift, they start shifting from period t=1.
When selecting among triggers, it seems natural to think of the following minimal conditions.
Condition 1 At period t, only =0 (or i;0 ) is never interpreted as a defection.
Condition 2 At period t,
Condition 1 requires the signal =0 (or i;0 ), disclosed at period t, to be the only signal following which no punishment at period t+1 is applied, even if this signal causes the price at period t to move in the wrong direction with respect to v. Condition 2 states that, if P 2 ( =1) (or P 2 ( i;$ )) shifts from 0, then P 2 ( = 1) (resp., P 2 ( i;$ 0 )) should somehow shift too, but in the opposite direction, and vice versa.
Even when restricting our attention just to Grim triggers, if only the …rst or second condition is imposed, for a variety of pairs and q, equilibria exist where prices shift di¤erently. This is shown in examples below. To simplify the argument, we focus on the case of mandatory trade disclosure and refer to the fundamental value properties de…ned in Section I.
First note that, when both conditions hold, the trigger in De…nition 2 is not discarded. The second condition alone is not enough to guarantee price-shift uniqueness. For instance, consider the following trigger strategy, which ensures that no punishment is applied when a sale is disclosed. The trigger di¤ers from the one in De…nition 2 in the function P 0 2 : =1 ! p 2 = ; =0 _ = 1 ! p 2 = q , 31 and in the following sequential condition: At the second auction of the t th period, if the outcome of all t 1 preceding periods has been =1^v>0 or = 1, then play P 0 2 ; otherwise, set p 2 =0. For su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently small q, this alternative trigger strategy is part of an equilibrium in which no defection ever occurs. In detail, when uninformed, L trades x 1 = x L , x 2 =2x L , expecting to earn positive pro…ts; when L observes v<0 (or v>0), he trades x 1 = x L (resp., x 1 =x L ), subsequently trading x 2 =2x L if q <v (resp., x 2 = 2x L if v< ), or x 2 =0 otherwise, expecting to earn more than under A. This equilibrium depends on disclosed sales never being classi…ed as defections, while it is irrelevant whether a disclosed inactivity is never considered to be a defection too. This is because L has 31 The symbol _ stands for or. no incentive to signal =0. 32 The …rst condition discards this alternative equilibrium. Likewise, the …rst condition alone is not enough to guarantee price-shift uniqueness. For example, consider a Grim trigger that satis…es the …rst condition, with a pre-defection pricing rule P 00 2 such that P 00 2 ( = 1)=P 00 2 ( =0)=0 and P 00 2 ( =1)= . When L is informed about v<0 (or uninformed), in the …rst round of each period he is indi¤erent about not trading and selling some quantity, provided he subsequently trades optimally in n=2. In fact, in either case he expects to earn x L (resp., 0 pro…ts)-that is, as much as under A-without incurring punishment. It follows that, for su¢ ciently high values of , equilibria exist in which a type informed about v<0 and an uninformed type hide their information completely, randomizing with identical probability (even 0 or 1) only between =0 and = 1. Indeed, the leader's objective is to earn more than under A whenever he turns out to know v>0, in which case he expects to earn L( = ) per period by disclosing a purchase and trading optimally. Since the second condition prevents P 00 2 ( = 1) from equalling 0 when P 00 2 ( =1) di¤ers from 0, this alternative equilibrium is eliminated.
Provided the …rst condition is satis…ed, when changing the mapping P 00 2 by gradually shifting the price response to the signal = 1 from 0 to positive values, for su¢ ciently high, informative equilibria can be identi…ed immediately, in which L discloses inactivity today when he is aware of v<0 or uninformed. In fact, in this case the signal =0 is the only one that allows him not to defect with certainty and earn as under A today, but more than under A-that is, L( = )-any time he is aware of v>0 in the future. The joint e¤ect of both these conditions discards this counterintuitive equilibrium too, since the price response to the signal = 1 is required to be negative when the price response to the signal =1 is positive. Now, let's draw the attention just to Grim trigger strategies such that, before defection, the way period t prices react to period t disclosures is identical among periods. Under mandatory trade (or voluntary trade, or uncerti…ed/non-factual message) disclosure, for the same pair and q, more than one pre-defection pricing rule can, in some instances, simultaneously satisfy the market e¢ ciency condition and the two conditions above. However, as an indirect consequence of the next lemma, the associated outcome is identical, provided Condition 3 (presented below) holds too. This outcome coincides with that in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 (both generalized in Corollary 3) for what concerns mandatory and voluntary trade disclosure respectively, and with that in Corollary 4 for what concerns uncerti…ed/non-factual messages.
Lemma 5 Consider trade (or uncerti…ed/non-factual message) disclosure, an in…nitely repeated structure, and beliefs that are restricted to be such that, at period t, Condition 1 and 2 hold. When P 2 ( =1)>0 (resp., P 2 ( i;m6 =0 ) 6 = 0) and P 2 ( =0) (resp., P 2 ( i;0 )) is 'su¢ ciently close'(but not necessarily equal) to 0, both types of insider prefer to lead, signaling 6 = 0 (resp., i;m6 =0 ), rather than to signal =0 (resp., i;0 ). Prices that shift di¤erently are never justi…ed.
Proof of Lemma 5. In the …rst part of this proof, part I, we consider mandatory and voluntary trade disclosure. In part II, we consider disclosure of uncerti…ed/non-factual messages.
(I) First, we prove that a pre-defection pricing rule such that P 2 ( = 1) 0 P 2 ( =1) and with P 2 ( =0) 'too far away'from 0 does not satisfy the market e¢ ciency condition. Suppose that P 2 ( =0)<0 (the case of P 2 ( =0)>0 is symmetric). If type s=I^ v>0 decides to signal =1-that is, given the pricing rule in question, to lead-it is optimal for him to trade x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L when v<P 2 ( =1), and x 1 =x L ; x 2 =0 when v P 2 ( =1), earning under 32 On the contrary, for high values of q, this alternative trigger is not justi…ed. Rather than leading-i.e., signaling =1-an insider aware of v>0 prefers to trade x 1 = x L ,x 2 =2x L -i.e., to signal = 1-in this way causing the price to shift in the wrong direction with certainty, without being punished for it.
If he decides to signal =0-without being punished for that-under mandatory (or voluntary) trade disclosure, it is optimal for him to trade
, type s=I^ v>0 prefers to signal =0 rather than =1, causing the pricing rule not to be justi…ed.
Second, to prove that a pre-defection pricing rule such that P 2 ( =1) 0 P 2 ( = 1) and P 2 ( =0) 6 = 0 is not justi…ed, suppose that P 2 ( =0)<0 (the case of P 2 ( =0)>0 is symmetric). Type s=I^ v>0 prefers to signal =0 rather than leading, signaling = 1. It follows that his best response causes the price shift to be wrong with certainty.
Third, to prove that P 2 ( =1) P 2 ( =0)=0 P 2 ( = 1) implies no departure from A, we show that type s=I^ v>0 prefers to signal =0 rather than leading, signaling = 1 (for a symmetric argument, type s=I^ v<0 prefers to signal =0 rather than =1). In fact, if type s=I^ v>0 signals =0, under mandatory (or voluntary) trade disclosure, it is optimal for him to trade x 1 =0,x 2 =x L (resp., x 1 = ,x 2 =x L x 1 ), earning under expectation x L per period. Conversely, if he decides to signal = 1, he can trades x 1 . 0 and then trade optimally, buying or selling depending on the realization of v=v, and expecting to earn less than x L ; alternatively, if he trades x 1 = x L , then he …nds it optimal to trade x 2 =2x L when P 2 ( = 1)<v, and x 2 =0 when
(II) Let's now consider a pre-defection pricing rule such that P 2 ( i;$ 0 ) 0 P 2 ( i;$ ), where $ equals 1 (or 1) when $ 0 equals 1 (resp., 1), and with P 2 ( i;0 ) 'too far away' from 0. This pricing rule does not satisfy the market e¢ ciency condition. Suppose that P 2 ( i;0 )<0 (the case of P 2 ( i;0 )>0 is symmetric). If type s=I^ v>0 decides to lead-that is, to send i;$ -it is easy to show that he …nds it optimal to trade x 1 =x L ; x 2 = 2x L when v<P 2 ( i;$ ), and x 1 =x L ; x 2 =0 when v P 2 ( i;$ ), in this way earning under expecta-
vf ( v)d vg. If he decides to send i;0 -which is a signal that allows him not to be punished even though it pushes the price in the wrong direction-it is optimal for him to trade x 1 = x L ; x 2 =2x L , earning under expectation
Thus, if P 2 ( i;0 ) is smaller than 2 R P 2 ( i;$ ) 0 [ v P 2 ( i;$ )]f ( v)d v, the pricing rule is not justi…ed, because type s=I^ v>0 prefers to signal i;0 rather than i;$ .
To give an insight into this lemma, we refer to the case of mandatory/voluntary trade disclosure (for what concerns uncerti…ed or non-factual messages, the intuition is slightly simpler than what is explained here and the related implications are in line with it). The two conditions above restrict the analysis to two classes of pre-defection pricing rules, P 2 ( =1) 0 P 2 ( = 1) and P 2 ( = 1) 0 P 2 ( =1), setting no condition on whether the missed disclosure of a purchase or a sale shifts prices. (i) When P 2 ( =1) 0 P 2 ( = 1), no equilibrium with informative disclosures arises. In fact, while for P 2 ( =0) 6 = 0 the market e¢ ciency condition does not hold, for P 2 ( =0)=0 an insider aware of v>0 (or v<0) prefers to signal =0 rather than leading-i.e., disclosing = 1 (resp., =1)-which causes no departure from A to occur. (ii) When P 2 ( = 1) 0 P 2 ( =1), (ii.a) if P 2 ( =0) is negative (or positive) and set 'too far away'from 0, the market e¢ ciency condition does not hold. In fact, an insider aware about v>0 (resp., v<0) prefers to signal =0-that is, to pretend to be uninformed, moving the price down (resp., up) without being punished for that-rather than leading. Instead, (ii.b) if P 2 ( =0) is 'su¢ ciently close' (or equal) to 0-in detail, for P 2 ( =0) such that
where % equals 4 (or 2) when disclosures are mandatory (resp., voluntary)-both types of insider prefer to lead optimally rather than signaling =0.
Condition 3 If at any point in time the leader turns out to be indi¤erent, given his multiperiod decision problem, between misleading (or blu¢ ng) and leading (resp., not blu¢ ng) optimally, he is believed to opt for the latter alternative with probability 1.
When beliefs are restricted in such a way that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, if prices move, under R1 -R4, the shift only follows a disclosed purchase or sale, turning out to be positive or negative respectively, but-because of the symmetry of f ( v), the space of actions, and the consequences that the misleading behavior of one or the other type of insider imply, and thanks to Condition 3-equal to q or in magnitude, depending on whether r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) or (q; = ) respectively. Together, the market e¢ ciency condition and Conditions 1 and 2 also imply that, if the signal =0 is sent, it never shifts equilibrium prices. Indeed, equilibrium pricing rules exist, with prices that at a certain period respond, with a shift, to the signal =0 disclosed at the same period. For instance, when r^q =1 or when r(q; =q ) < (q; = ) q<1, any Grim trigger with a pre-punishment pricing rule such that, at every period before defection, P 2 ( =1)= P 2 ( = 1)=q and 0<jP 2 ( =0) j % R q 0 (q v)f ( v)d v also satis…es the market e¢ ciency condition and Conditions 1 to 3. Nonetheless, the associated equilibrium outcome coincides with that derived when prices shift according to the trigger in De…nition 2. The reason being that, before defection (if any), no type of leader …nds it optimal to disclose =0. Thus, there is no loss in generality in assuming that, at each period, P 2 ( =0)=0.
When the following two inter-temporal restrictions on beliefs also hold, for any pair ; q, it is possible to identify a unique way in which prices at a certain period can shift in response to one disclosure or another, sent at that period. This result is presented below, in Proposition 4.
First notice that, even when the Grim punishment is taken into account and Conditions 1 to 3 hold, there exist equilibria such that, before defection, a (…nite, well known) number of periods in which disclosures are believed to convey information concerning what L observes is alternated with a non-necessarily equal (but …nite and well known) number of periods in which no disclosure is believed to be informative. The next condition restricts beliefs by eliminating this option. Otherwise, for the same pair ; q, depending on how regularly, before defection, periods in which disclosures are believed to be informative are alternated with periods in which they are not, the incentive to mislead (or blu¤) as an alternative to leading (resp., not to blu¤) is a¤ected, with clear consequences on the way pre-defection prices can react to disclosures.
Condition 4 If at a certain period disclosures are believed to be informative, also at each subsequent period they are believed to be informative, in one way or another, until a defection occurs.
Second, consider any pair and q such that a speci…c equilibrium pricing rule exists, where pre-defection price shifts are supported by a Grim punishment. For (almost 33 ) all these pairs and q, an identical pre-defection pricing rule followed by a less severe punishment (that is, a non-Grim punishment) is also part of an equilibrium where, at some point after defection, prices start reacting to disclosures again. Condition 5 constrains beliefs formed in response to a disclosure-and prices set by a market maker holding those beliefs-as follows.
Condition 5 Let beliefs be such that: (i) Before each defection, if prices shift, they shift as if, after defection, a Grim punishment occurs. (ii) After a speci…c defection, (at least in some 33 For an intuition concerning the weight of the adverb 'almost', see after Proposition 4. periods) prices can shift, provided the implicit punishment following this defection represents a deterrent to support past prices, equivalent to the Grim punishment.
To see the implications of this condition, let's refer, for the sake of simplicity, to the result in Proposition 3. For r(q; =q ), if prices start reacting again after defection, and in a way that does not represent a deterrent that is as strong as the Grim punishment, before a …rst defection the incentive to mislead (or blu¤) as an alternative to leading (resp., not to blu¤) can be a¤ected. 34 Condition 5 eliminates this possibility.
Proposition 4 Consider trade (or uncerti…ed/non-factual message) disclosure, the in…nitely repeated structure, and beliefs that are restricted in such a way that Conditions 1 to 5 hold. Under R1-R4, at any period disclosures can a¤ect prices if and only if they are believed to be informative. At a speci…c period, if the equilibrium price p 2 increases (or decreases), for (q; = ), this shift equals (resp., ) and follows the signal =1 or i;$ 0 (resp., = 1 or i;$ ), sent by type s=I^ v>0 (resp., s=I^ v<0); for r(q; =q ) < (q; = ), it equals q (resp., q ) and follows the signal =1 or i;$ 0 (resp., = 1 or i;$ ), sent by types s=I^ v>0 (resp., s=I^ v<0) or s=U . For <r(q; =q ), no shift ever occurs.
Given Conditions 1 to 5, for =r(q; =q ) and = (q; = ), before a …rst defection (if any), equilibrium prices shift only if, after this defection, M believes that every disclosure is not informative-that is, if all post-defection prices equal 0. Conversely, for each pair ; q such that r(q; =q )< < (q; = ) or > (q; = ), equilibria exist where, after defection, prices start reacting to disclosures again. In this case, not only the Grim punishment, but also other less severe punishments, represent equivalent threats that support (and therefore justify) pre-defection price shifts. In particular, for r(q; =q )< < (q; = )^q<1, an unlimited number of alternative post-defection equilibrium outcomes is possible. To see it, for each of these latter pairs and q, consider any equilibrium pricing rule such that, immediately after a …rst defection, M punishes by reverting to single period equilibrium behavior for a minimum, …nite, number of periods which make the entire post-defection pricing rule in question su¢ cient to support all prices set before that defection. Clearly, in…nite other equilibria exist where, following the same defection, M correctly believes that no disclosure is informative at all, for a …nite number of periods greater than this minimum number.
Internet Appendix D
Informative disclosure of a reversal (or of its absence) when inside information is long-lived. This appendix considers a situation where trade disclosure is imposed when the short-swing rule is not, and characterizes an equilibrium where a leader that repeatedly acquires long-lived inside information and weights future pro…ts su¢ ciently never manipulates and price e¢ ciency is higher than under Section 16(b). For simplicity's sake, we refer to the case of N =3, where P =hP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 i is M's pricing rule (for N >3, the argument is similar). Speci…cally, in n=3, the signal 0 2 f 1; 0; 1g is released: 0 =1 (or 0 = 1; or 0 =0) reveals that in n=2 the leader bought (resp., sold; did not trade); hence, because 3 =f ; 0 g, it follows that 34 Consider the Grim trigger in De…nition 2. When a weaker (or much weaker) punishment is threatened, for at least some (resp., all) pairs ; q such that r(q; =q ) < (q; = ), equilibria where disclosures are never informative can arise. Similarly, for at least some pairs ; q such that (q; = )-but never for pairs with an extremely high value of -equilibria with either manipulative or not informative (resp., equilibria with not informative) disclosures can arise. b; b] . Under the assumption that the statistical properties of v de…ned in Section I hold, consider a sequential condition, such that prices at period t react to disclosed trades, unless disclosure moved prices away from the fundamental value in any of the t 1 preceding periods. At the equilibrium, an uninformed leader never trades, while a leader aware of v>0 behaves as follows (the strategy of one aware about v<0 is symmetric): In the …rst auction, he buys x L . Speci…cally, when v=v 2 [0; ), he reverses his position up to the maximum capacity in round n=2; then, if v=v 2 [ ; ), where =E[ vj0 v ], this reversal is followed by a second reversal at the third auction-that is, x 3 =2x L ; conversely, if v=v 2 (0; ), then x 3 =0. When v=v 2 [ ; b], he does not trade in the second action; then, if v=v 2 [ ; ), where =E [ vj v b] , he reverses his position up to the maximum capacity at the third auction; conversely, if v=v 2 [ ; b], then x 3 =0. For what concerns equilibrium prices, following an initial purchase, at the second auction the price response P 2 ( =1) equals , while at the third auction P 3 ( =1 0 = 1 ) and P 3 ( =1 0 =0 ) equal and respectively; symmetrically, following an initial sale, we have P 2 ( = 1)= , P 3 ( = 1 0 =1 )= , and P 3 ( = 1 0 =0 )= ; …nally, not only P 1 ( ) and P 2 ( =0), but also P 3 ( =0; ), equal 0. Interestingly, by trading in round n=1 and not trading in n=2, absence of disclosure at the beginning of n=3 moves prices at that round. Absolute continuity of F ( v) and symmetry of f ( v) can be easily relaxed, and a more general set of restrictions that includes R1-R4 identi…ed.
Internet Appendix E Pre-trade non-anonymity and the informational content of a missed submission. Here we analyze a regulation mandating public revelation of submitted orders, describing the e¤ect that an initial lack of submissions by L has on prices. Two cases are in order.
(I) Consider the case in which both v=b and v=b have zero mass. At any round n taking place before a …rst order is e¤ectively submitted, even when a missed order submission conveys relevant information about the fundamental value, the price response P n (x i =0; 8i 2 f1; ::; ng) equals E [ v] . To see it, denote, with n;b 2 [0; 1] (resp., n;b 2 [0; 1]), the probability with which type s=I^ v=b (or s=I^ v=b) is correctly believed to sell (resp., buy) at any of these rounds. Now, let's consider a situation where, for example, 1;b =0 and 1;b =1. In this case, the signal x 1 =0 implies that L is not aware of v=b (otherwise, a buy order in round n=1 would have been placed with certainty). However, because the event v=b is a zero-probability one, it follows that P 1 (x 1 =0)=qE[ vj v6 = b]+(1 q)E[ v]=E [ v] .
(II) Consider the case in which either v=b or v=b has positive mass. Before a …rst order is e¤ectively placed, di¤erent price responses supported by alternative sets of beliefs are justi…ed. To see it, let's focus on the case of beliefs formed in response to disclosures by a leader that employes pure strategies. De…ne, with c 2 f1; ::; N g (or d 2 f1; ::; N g), the …rst rounds in which an insider aware of v=b (resp., v=b) is correctly believed to submit a sell (resp., buy) order rather than no order. At each round n<min fc; dg, since no type of leader trades, P n<minfc;dg (x n<minfc;dg =0) equals E [ v] . From round n=min fc; dg (included) onwards, until the auction in which a …rst order is placed (excluded), prices are set as follows. (i) If c<d, a missed order submission at round n=c highlights that L does not observe v=b. Since he is either aware of b<v b or uninformed, the price at round n 2 fc; ::; d 1g, P n2fc;::;d 1g (x n c =0), equals qE[ vjb<v]+(1 q)E [ v] . For a symmetric argument, (ii) if d<c, then P n2fd;::;c 1g (x n d =0) equals qE[ vjv<b]+(1 q)E [ v] . Finally, (iii) if c=d, any missed disclosure at round n=c causes the price from that auction (included) onwards, P n c=d (x n c =0), to equal qE[ vjb<v<b]+(1 q)E [ v] . In general, whenever the probability that v equals b (or b) is positive, there exist in…nite equilibria such that, following an initial series of missed submissions, a partial revelation of L's type occurs. However, given the same series of missed submission, a perfect revelation is possible only if v2 fb; bg.
